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Abstract 
The evaluation of the Coalition’s employment policy shows that although the labour 
market was remarkably resilient over the recession in terms of employment rates, this 
was largely driven by falling real wages and increases in self-employment. For many, 
employment became more precarious through the growth in zero hours contracts and 
insecure self-employment on very low incomes. The young were hit hardest with the 
recession having differential generational consequences, as unlike in previous 
recessions older workers did not suffer from skill redundancies as the recession was 
not accompanied by large scale industrial restructuring. In fact there was a 
redistribution of employment from younger workers to older workers including those 
working beyond the state pension age. The Government introduced a range of new 
active labour market programmes and reformed existing programmes but these 
reforms are best described as an evolution rather than a revolution as they built on a 
strong policy platform put in place by the previous Labour Government. Despite 
employment reaching new record levels, the performance of the Government’s active 
labour market programmes did not meet expectations and for some time, and 
particularly for some groups, the new programmes delivered results below those 
achieved by the programmes they replaced. A greater emphasis on private providers 
delivering services and being paid according to the results they achieve with higher 
financial incentives available for groups requiring additional help (in particular groups 
whose work capability is affected by illness or disability) has not improved relative 
outcomes for the most disadvantaged groups. The fiasco around work capability 
assessments and the fact that active labour market programmes are still failing to meet 
the needs of those deemed capable of work in a limited capacity suggests that a major 
review is now required for this group of claimants. 
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1. Introduction  
This is one of a series of papers examining aspects of the social policy record of the 
UK Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition 2010-15, with a particular focus on 
poverty, inequality and the distribution of social and economic outcomes. The papers 
follow a similar but smaller set covering Labour’s record from 1997-2010, published 
in 2013. They follow the same format as those papers. Starting with a brief assessment 
of the situation the Coalition inherited from Labour, they move to a description of the 
Coalition’s aims (as discerned from manifestos, the Coalition Agreement and 
subsequent policy statements) and the policies enacted. They then describe trends in 
spending on the area under consideration, and an account of what was bought with the 
money expended (inputs and outputs). Finally, they turn to outcomes, and a discussion 
of the relationship between policies, spending and outcomes, so far as this can be 
discerned.  
 
All the papers focus on UK policy where policy is not devolved (for example taxes 
and benefits) and English policy where it is, although in some cases some spending, 
outcomes and international comparisons cannot be disaggregated below the UK level. 
In the case of devolved policy areas, key points of similarity and difference between 
England and the other UK nations are highlighted, but a full four country comparison 
is beyond the scope of the study. 
 
Unlike some of the others in the series, this paper does not follow a similar one for the 
Labour period as employment was not separately covered. For this reason, rather more 
time is spent outlining the inheritance and taking a longer view in the outcomes 
section in terms of trends. In common with the policy regime, the paper takes a 
supply-side perspective, concentrating on government efforts to move people off out-
of-work benefits into (sustainable) work. Policies aimed at increasing the level of 
demand for labour through economic development and industrial strategies are 
relevant but arguably these policies have been much less prominent both under this 
government and the last. 
 
2.  The Coalition’s Inheritance 
The Coalition entered government in a period of relatively high and increasing 
unemployment following the 2007/08 financial and economic crisis. Preceding the 
rise in unemployment the UK had enjoyed the longest period of economic growth for 
over a century and employment rates had reached record levels (McKnight, 2009). 
The Labour government had built on the changes introduced by the outgoing 
Conservative government (1979-1997) in relation to the design of active labour 
market programmes, in particular Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) (introduced in 1996) 
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which incorporated a more demanding regime in terms of what was expected of 
jobseekers in return for their entitlement to receive out of work benefits1. 
Employment and employment policy had undergone a number of important 
transformations during the time that the Labour Party had been in power (1997-2010). 
New Labour came into government in 1997 without a pledge for full employment, 
breaking with Labour Party traditions. They adopted a modern definition of full 
employment and instead made a commitment to ‘Employment Opportunity for All’ 
(Gordon Brown, Pre-Budget speech November 1997); later defining an employment 
rate of 80 per cent of the working age population as an aspiration. Within this 
definition it was recognised that some unemployment was both inevitable and even 
desirable. This level of unemployment is often referred to as frictional unemployment 
and is determined by the gaps in time between workers moving between jobs, the time 
it takes for new entrants and re-entrants to find work, seasonal unemployment and 
short term mismatches between labour supply and labour demand. The Labour 
government set out to tackle structural unemployment which is a more fundamental 
long term mismatch between labour supply and labour demand.  
 
Through a raft of policies Labour made considerable progress in both reducing and 
keeping structural unemployment down and what the Coalition government inherited 
was a third type of unemployment which economists typically refer to as cyclical 
unemployment. Cyclical unemployment, taking its name from the business cycle, 
occurs where aggregate demand is not sufficient to provide enough jobs for the 
number of available workers. Unemployment during recessions is generally thought to 
arise because wages tend to be ‘sticky’, not adjusting downwards in response to 
falling demand, the outcome of which is that firms both limit recruitment and lay-off 
workers, either due to a contraction in output or because they go out of business.  
 
Another break from Labour’s past was a shift in policy emphasis away from demand 
side policies to supply side policies. Instead of large scale job creation programmes 
the policy emphasis was on improving the skills of the workforce, creating a more 
flexible and adaptable workforce, and working to re-engage long term unemployed 
people and tackling youth unemployment2. 
 
Concerns had grown over the 1980s and into the 1990s regarding increasing levels of 
long term unemployment and how this share of the potential labour force was so 
distant from the labour market that they could no longer be considered part of the 
effective labour supply (see for example, Layard et al., 1994). Lord Layard, one of the 
key labour market experts in this area, worked with the Labour Party in developing 
                                              
1
  Under JSA entitlement to contribution based out of work benefit (based on National 
Insurance contributions and not means tested) was cut from 12 months to 6 months after 
which unemployed jobseekers could apply for income-based (means tested) JSA. For an 
evaluation of JSA see Smith et al., 2000. 
2
  One of the five specific pledges offered by the Labour Party and included on a pledge card in 
the lead up to the 1997 General Election was to “get 250,000 under-25-year-olds off benefit 
and into work by using money from a windfall levy on the privatised utilities”. 
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the New Deal programme. This programme was designed as both an investment 
programme tackling high levels of youth unemployment and a way to turn the long 
term unemployed into effective jobseekers. There was underpinning this programme a 
strong emphasis on ‘Rights and Responsibilities’ which recognised unemployed 
people’s entitlement to unemployment benefit but made clear that benefit receipt was 
conditional on them taking active steps to find work. The introduction of the New 
Deal programmes transformed active labour market programmes in the UK, 
jobseekers were expected to do much more to prepare for work and secure 
employment than had ever been the case. Tailor-made programmes were initially 
created for different groups of jobseekers (under 25s, long-term unemployed 25-49 
year olds, older people 50+, disabled people, lone parents and musicians). There were 
different degrees of compulsion and provision but from October 2009 a single 
programme, the Flexible New Deal, replaced all of the different programmes. Latterly, 
private providers were increasingly used to deliver employment services. They were 
contracted to provide elements of the New Deal for Young People, the delivery of 
employment services to long-term unemployed people living in Employment Zones3 
and from 2009 more extensively in the delivery of the Flexible New Deal. 
 
The Labour government also sought to bring other out-of-work groups back into the 
labour force. Out-of-work welfare benefit recipients traditionally not required to 
actively seek work (such as lone parents and some people with disabilities) were being 
increasingly moved onto ‘active’ benefits and required to search for work as a 
condition of their benefit receipt. Concern had grown that the previous Conservative 
government (1979-1997) had tried to hide the extent of unemployment by moving a 
significant number of unemployment benefit claimants onto disability related benefits 
which didn’t count in terms of unemployment measured using the ‘Claimant count’ 
(Alcock et al., 2003; Beatty and Fothergill, 2004). The share of the working age 
population claiming disability-related out of work benefits did increase but whether 
this was the result of conscious policy or because these benefits, and the regime that 
accompanied them, were more attractive to out of work claimants or simply because 
disability incidence and its recognition grew in the working age population is not 
clear. Not only was this increase costly as these benefits are more generous but 
claimants circumstances in relation to their entitlement to these benefits were not 
reviewed and they were not required to attend interviews with job centre advisers. The 
claimant count became such an unreliable measure of unemployment due to the fact 
that it only covered a fraction of unemployed people that the Labour government 
adopted the widely used ILO measure of unemployment4 as its preferred measure. 
 
                                              
3
  Employment Zones (EZ) were introduced in 2000 in 15 areas of the UK where high levels of 
long term unemployment persisted. In these areas New Deal 25+ was replaced by EZ 
programmes.  
4
  Individuals are counted as unemployed under the ILO definition if they are out of work but 
have been looking for work in the past four weeks and are available to start work in the next 
two weeks. It is not dependent on their benefit status and is an internationally recognised 
standard measure of unemployment.  
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Social change also played a part in driving increases in workless household rates with 
an increasing number of families headed by a lone parent in the UK (usually a 
mother). Evidence showed that while employment rates among mothers who were 
part of a couple were increasing, the same was not true for lone parent mothers (Gregg 
and Harkness, 2003; McKnight, 2005). While it was accepted that there were good 
reasons why the employment rates between these two groups might differ, the Labour 
Party was of the opinion that employment was the best route out of poverty and the 
overlap between children living in a workless household and the chances of that 
household being in low income poverty. This was behind many of the policy changes 
designed to increase employment rates among lone parents. At one time there was a 
target to increase the rate of employment among lone parents to 70 per cent by 2010 
and although this was abandoned and not met, employment rates did increase and the 
share of lone parents claiming Income Support did fall, some of which could be 
attributed to government policy (Gregg and Harkness, 2003; McKnight, 2000).  
 
UK governments have traditionally spent relatively low amounts on active labour 
market programmes; below the OECD average and considerably lower than France 
and Germany (OECD xstat). The US is also a low investor in active employment 
policy and in 1997, according to OECD statistics, both the UK and the US were 
spending a similar share of GDP on this policy area (0.19 and 0.24% GDP, 
respectively); this was in contrast to Germany spending 1.11% GDP and France 
1.22% GDP. The share of GDP spent on active employment policy increased under 
the Labour government with a boost in expenditure on the New Deal programmes 
(initially funded by a £5 billion windfall levy on privatised utilities) and since the start 
of the economic and financial crisis due to the increase in the number of unemployed 
people requiring employment services. In 2010 around 0.4% GDP was spent on active 
employment policy (OECD xstat); the OECD average was 0.6% GDP. 
 
Not only is employment unequally distributed among the working age population, 
hitting those with the lowest marketable skills hardest, but so too are the rewards from 
work. Over the 1980s earnings inequality in the UK rose faster and further than in any 
EU country and while the debate continues on the dominant cause of this rise, there is 
now a general consensus that globalisation, skill biased technological change and the 
decline in the power of labour market institutions each contributed to this increase 
(McKnight and Tsang, 2013). While the Labour Party did not pledge to bring earnings 
inequality down, in their 1997 manifesto they outlined a commitment to tackle the 
growing problem of low wage employment through the introduction of a National 
Minimum Wage (NMW). The NMW transformed the low wage labour market in the 
UK and effectively eradicated extreme low pay in the formal labour market, yet the 
UK continued to have one of the highest shares of workers employed in low paid jobs 
and there is evidence to suggest that the NMW is being used as a ‘going rate’ by many 
employers (Resolution Foundation, 2014). 
 
The NMW was part of a wider “Making Work Pay” agenda which also involved 
strengthening and widening in-work benefits (WFTC/WTC) and reducing tax paid by 
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low paid workers (through changes to the National Insurance schedule, Income tax 
rates and Personal Allowances).  
 
A number of important changes were introduced under the Labour government 
regarding the regulation of employment and improvements to workers’ rights arising 
from EU directives; although in some cases the UK negotiated opt outs. Many of these 
regulations focused on protecting ‘marginal’ workers in growing forms of ‘flexible 
employment’ (sometime referred to as atypical employment), to provide for a 
healthier work-life balance particularly for parents, to improve health and safety at 
work and to regulate for equal treatment across different groups of workers. 
 
Employers of part-time workers and fixed-term employees were prevented from 
treating these workers less favourably than full-time or permanent employees through 
The Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 
and the Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) 
Regulations 2002. 
 
In 2003 the UK Working Time Regulations (EU Working Time Directive) came into 
force, updating earlier versions from 2000 and 1993, giving workers the right to a 
minimum number of holidays each year (20 days), rest breaks (a rest period for every 
six hours of work), and rest of at least 11 hours in any 24 hour period. It restricts 
excessive night work, gives workers the right to a weekly day off work (24 hours 
uninterrupted) and provides for a right for most employees to work no more than 48 
hours per week; although the UK negotiated a voluntary opt out of the 48 hour limit to 
the working week. This means that an employee can voluntarily opt out but is required 
to submit this in writing to their employer5.  
 
Also introduced in the 2003 Employment Act was the right for parents of young and 
disabled children, who had been working for their employer for a minimum of 26 
weeks, to apply for flexible working arrangements. This right was extended in 2007 to 
cover carers of adults. Although employers can turn down a request, any request has 
to be taken seriously and can only be turned down on reasonable grounds. Employees 
can ask ACAS to arbitrate where an agreement cannot be reached and employees have 
a right to take the matter to an employment tribunal.  
 
A number of pieces of legislation were brought in to prevent employer discrimination 
against: age (The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006); religion or belief 
(The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003) and sexual 
orientation (The Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003[5]).  
 
The Labour government had made huge gains in the labour market with record levels 
of employment prior to the 2007/08 financial and economic crisis. However, the 
Coalition formed a government a little over two years after the start of the financial 
                                              
5
  Employees in a small number of occupations are not allowed to opt out of the 48 hour limit 
(such as airline staff). 
 6 
 
and economic crisis. Unemployment rates had increased steeply since the start of 2008 
through the rise in cyclical unemployment and stood at 8.1% in May 2010 with 1.5 
million people in the UK claiming JSA (claimant count) and a total of 4.93 million 
working age people claiming out-of-work benefits. Given the depth of the recession, 
the global extent of the recession (affecting domestic and export markets) and the 
experience of recent UK recessions, expectations were that unemployment would rise 
further and remain high for some time. Added to this youth unemployment had started 
increasing prior to the recession. 
 
Labour had transformed active labour market policy but was still struggling to have a 
big impact on increasing employment outcomes for the long term unemployed, 
tackling youth unemployment or low rates of employment among people with a long 
term illness or disability. In addition, significant disparities in employment and wage 
rates persisted between different ethnic groups and between men and women. 
 
3.  Aims 
In this section we outline the employment policy aims of the Coalition government 
included in the Coalition Agreement and then trace their origins back to the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat 2010 election manifestos. The Coalition’s aims 
for employment policy, as set out in the Coalition Agreement, were largely linked to 
reforms of the welfare system and active labour market programmes with a little on 
regulation and equality (Cabinet Office 2010). The big announcement was that all 
existing welfare to work programmes would end and be replaced by a single 
programme to help unemployed people get back into work. This was coupled with a 
pledge to investigate how to simplify the benefit system in order to improve incentives 
to work (p23). This included points on how different types of claimants would be 
treated within the system and at what point claimants would be eligible for assistance 
through the welfare to work programme: 
“we will ensure that Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants facing the most 
significant barriers to work are referred to the new welfare to work 
programme immediately, not after 12 months as is currently the case. 
We will ensure that Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants aged under 25 are 
referred to the programme after a maximum of six months.” and  
“we will re-assess all current claimants of Incapacity Benefit for their 
readiness to work. Those assessed as fully capable for work will be 
moved onto Jobseeker’s Allowance”. 
It was made clear that there would be a greater emphasis on the conditionality of 
qualifying for out of work benefits: 
“we will ensure that receipt of benefits for those able to work is 
conditional on their willingness to work”.  
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Other aims related to how the contracts and funding of providers used to deliver active 
labour market programmes would be reformed, demonstrating a greater emphasis on 
payment by results and financial savings: 
“we will realign contracts with welfare to work service providers to 
reflect more closely the results they achieve in getting people back into 
work” and 
“we will reform the funding mechanism used by government to reflect 
the fact that initial investment delivers later savings through lower 
benefit expenditure, including creating an integrated work programme 
with outcome funding based upon the DEL/AME switch.”6 
 
There was very little detail on what changes would be made to welfare to work 
programmes in terms of what would be on offer, with one pledge on promoting self-
employment as a route out of unemployment: 
“we will support would-be entrepreneurs through a new programme – 
Work for Yourself – which will give the unemployed access to business 
mentors and start-up loans”. 
Another recognising that some job seekers lacked sufficient skills and experience, 
hinting that the Coalition government was not going to pursue a simple “work first” 
welfare to work programme: 
“we will draw on a range of Service Academies to offer pre-
employment training and work placements for unemployed people” 
and the fact that self-help would be promoted: 
“we will develop local Work Clubs – places where unemployed people 
can gather to exchange skills, find opportunities, make contacts and 
provide mutual support.”  
 
On employment legislation the Coalition Agreement reflected the fact that both parties 
supported the National Minimum Wage but made no commitment on how it should 
develop or more broadly about how and if low wage employment more broadly 
should be tackled: 
“we support the National Minimum Wage because of the protection it 
gives low-income workers and the incentives to work it provides.” 
There was also a pledge to “review employment and workplace laws, for employers 
and employees, to ensure they maximise flexibility for both parties while protecting 
                                              
6
  In this context DEL/AME switch is where one type of public expenditure (here savings from 
benefit expenditure) are used to offset the cost incurred in making that saving (delivering the 
programmes that assist jobseekers to leave benefit and find work) and these are paid to the 
contracted providers instead of a service fee. This means that the Work Programme will be 
largely paid for out of Annual Managed Expenditure (AME) rather than Departmental 
Expenditure Limit (DEL) as previous welfare to work programmes have been. 
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fairness and providing the competitive environment required for enterprise to thrive.” 
(p10) 
On labour market equality the Coalition said that they would tackle gender inequality 
in the labour market with a pledge to “promote equal pay and take a range of 
measures to end discrimination in the workplace” as well as “look to promote gender 
equality on the boards of listed companies”. For ethnic minorities the Coalition 
government pledged to 
“… [provide] internships for under-represented minorities in every 
Whitehall department and to [fund] a targeted national enterprise 
mentoring scheme for Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic people who 
wanted to start a business”. 
The only pledge in relation to tackling overall inequalities related to the public sector:  
“we will undertake a fair pay review in the public sector to implement 
our proposed ‘20 times’ multiple”; that no public sector worker can earn 
over 20 times more than the lowest paid person in their organisation. 
Under the equalities heading the Coalition agreement also includes a 
pledge to “extend the right to request flexible working to all employees, 
consulting with business on how best to do so” (p18).  
 
The hastily drafted Coalition Agreement, drawn up in five days following the 
inconclusive 2010 General Election, largely reflects employment policy pledges in the 
Conservative Manifesto. The new welfare to work programme – the Work Programme 
– was outlined in the Conservative Manifesto (Conservative Party 2010, p15/p16) and 
in speeches prior to the election in 2010 (see for example, Freud 2009). The 
Conservative Manifesto proposed the Work Programme as a way of reducing “welfare 
dependency” with a particular focus on Incapacity Benefit claimants who would all be 
reassessed, with those found to be fit to work transferred onto Jobseeker’s Allowance. 
In line with the pledges included in the Coalition Agreement, claimants would become 
eligible for assistance earlier in the Work Programme than under the Flexible New 
Deal that it would replace (straightaway for those facing the greatest barriers to work 
and after six months of unemployment for those aged under 25). It was made clear 
that the programme would be delivered by private and voluntary sector providers who 
would be rewarded according to their success in getting people into sustainable work. 
Service Academies and local Work Clubs were also outlined in the Conservative 
Manifesto. ‘Work-fare’ did not feature in the Coalition Agreement but the 
Conservatives in their manifesto did state that: 
“long term benefit claimants who fail to find work will be required to 
‘work for the dole’ on community work programmes”. 
Also the threat of sanctions featured in the manifesto which stated that JSA claimants 
refusing to join the Work Programme would lose their right to claim out-of-work 
benefits until they do, and that people who refuse to accept reasonable job offers could 
forfeit their benefits for up to three years.  
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In other areas, as well as measures designed to boost small businesses through 
taxation and steps to increase government research and procurement contracts being 
awarded to small and medium sized enterprises (p16), the Conservative Manifesto 
outlines the ‘Work for Yourself’ programme that made it into the Coalition 
Agreement. As well as indicating that the Conservatives would support the minimum 
wage they pledged to reduce the very high marginal tax rates faced by many people on 
low incomes (p16). On equality they stated that they would “force equal pay audits on 
any company found to be discriminating on the basis of gender”. They also made a 
commitment to abolish the default retirement age effectively increasing the length of 
the working life for many to reflect increasing life expectancy.  
 
The Conservatives in their 2010 Election Manifesto included eight “Benchmarks for 
Britain” which they invite the electorate to use to judge the economic success or 
failure for the next government. Number 3 relates specifically to employment: 
“3. Get Britain working again: We will reduce youth unemployment and 
reduce the number of children in workless households as part of our 
strategy for tackling poverty and inequality” (Conservative Party 2010, 
p5). 
The Liberal Democrats in their 2010 Election Manifesto (Liberal Democrat Party, 
2010) had very little to say about reforming active labour market programmes but 
chose to focus on job creation, something that didn’t feature in the Coalition 
Agreement: 
“To boost the economy and create jobs for those who need them, we 
will begin our term of office with a one-year economic stimulus and job 
creation package” (p21). 
This job creation was to be linked with a green economic stimulus package: 
“Liberal Democrats will begin our term of office with a one-year job 
creation and green economic stimulus package. We have identified £3.1 
billion of public spending that can be used to create 100,000 jobs. This 
programme will be a first step towards our target for a zero-carbon 
Britain by 2050” (p23). 
The plan involved refurbishing shipyards in the North of England and Scotland, an 
‘Eco Cash-Back’ scheme, energy efficiency improvements in schools and public 
buildings, bringing back 250,000 empty homes, investing £140 million on a bus 
scrappage scheme to help bus companies replace old polluting buses with new, 
accessible low-carbon ones and create more jobs (p23/p24).  
 
Some help was pledged by the Liberal Democrats to young people affected by the 
recession: 
“A work placement scheme with up to 800,000 places will ensure that 
young people have the opportunity to gain skills, qualifications and 
work experience even if they can’t find a job. Young people on the 
scheme would be paid £55 a week for up to three months.” (p24). 
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On equality, the Liberal Democrats pledged that they would: 
“require name-blind job application forms to reduce sex and race 
discrimination in employment, initially for every company with over 
100 employees”; introduce “fair pay audits for every company with over 
100 employees to combat discrimination in pay, for example against 
women. We will require all public companies to declare in full all 
remunerations of £200,000 per year or more.” 
And the only pledge that touched on welfare to work reform (‘Welfare’ does not even 
appear in the index) is in relation to fair access to work and employment services for 
people with disabilities: 
“[Give] disabled job seekers better practical help to get to work, using 
voluntary and private sector providers, as well as JobCentre Plus 
services. We will also reform Access to Work, so disabled people can 
apply for jobs with funding already in place for equipment and 
adaptation that they need.” (p30). 
The only mention of the minimum wage in the Liberal Democrats manifesto was a 
pledge to “Set the minimum wage at the same level for all workers over 16 (except for 
those on apprenticeships)” (p51).  
 
The Coalition entered government largely adopting the Conservative party’s proposed 
reforms to active labour market policies and rapidly replaced the Flexible New Deal 
with the Work Programme. Reflecting the lack of input into the Coalition Agreement 
of Liberal Democrat policies in relation to welfare to work reform, and the absence of 
policy in this area in their Manifesto, Conservative politicians have had a monopoly 
on ministerial posts in relation to work and welfare.  
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Box 1: The Coalition Agreement 
In terms of employment policy the Coalition Agreement largely reflects policies 
outlined in the Conservative manifesto. Shared policies are underlined below; clauses 
in bold type stem entirely from the Liberal Democrats. 
Jobs and Welfare 
 We will end all existing welfare to work programmes and create a single welfare 
to work programme to help all unemployed people get back into work. 
 We will ensure that Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants facing the most significant 
barriers to work are referred to the new welfare to work programme immediately, 
not after 12 months as is currently the case. We will ensure that Jobseeker’s 
Allowance claimants aged under 25 are referred to the programme after a 
maximum of six months. 
 We will realign contracts with welfare to work service providers to reflect more 
closely the results they achieve in getting people back into work. 
 We will reform the funding mechanism used by government to finance welfare to 
work programmes to reflect the fact that initial investment delivers later savings 
through lower benefit expenditure, including creating an integrated work 
programme with outcome funding based upon the DEL/AME switch. 
 We will ensure that receipt of benefits for those able to work is conditional on their 
willingness to work. 
 We support the National Minimum Wage because of the protection it gives low-
income workers and the incentives to work it provides. 
 We will re-assess all current claimants of Incapacity Benefit for their readiness to 
work. Those assessed as fully capable for work will be moved onto Jobseeker’s 
Allowance. 
 We will support would-be entrepreneurs through a new programme – Work for 
Yourself – which will give the unemployed access to business mentors and start-
up loans. 
 We will draw on a range of Service Academies to offer pre-employment training 
and work placements for unemployed people. 
 We will develop local Work Clubs – places where unemployed people can gather 
to exchange skills, find opportunities, make contacts and provide mutual support. 
 We will investigate how to simplify the benefit system in order to improve 
incentives to work. 
Equalities 
 We will promote equal pay and take a range of measures to end discrimination in 
the workplace. 
 We will extend the right to request flexible working to all employees, consulting 
with business on how best to do so. 
 We will undertake a fair pay review in the public sector to implement our 
proposed ’20 times’ pay multiple.  
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In individual manifestos but not in the Coalition Agreement:  
 
Liberal Democrats: 
We will begin our term in office with a one-year job creation and green economic 
stimulus package. We have identified £3.1 billion of public spending that can be used 
to create 100,000 jobs.  
 
We will also create hundreds and thousands of opportunities for young people 
affected by the recession. A work placement scheme with up to 800,000 places will 
ensure that young people have the opportunity to gain skills, qualifications and work 
experience even if they can’t find a job. Young people on the scheme would be paid 
£55 a week for up to three months. (fed into the policy development of the Youth 
Contract). 
 
We will give disabled job seekers better practical help to get to work, using voluntary 
and private sector providers, as well as JobCentre Plus services. We will also reform 
Access to Work, so disabled people can apply for jobs with funding already in place 
for equipment and adaption that they need. (Largely implemented once in government 
through eligibility of ESA claimants to the Work Programme.) 
 
Conservatives: 
With the Conservatives, long-term benefit claimants who fail to find work will be 
required to ‘work for the dole’ on community work programmes. (Later introduced as 
‘Help to Work’ scheme for those returning to Jobcentre Plus having not secured 
employment after two years on the Work Programme). 
 
People who refuse to accept reasonable job offers could forfeit their benefits for up to 
three years. (in 2012 legislation was introduced that allowed claimants to be 
sanctioned for three years, stating that the three year sanction “will apply only in the 
most extreme cases where claimants have serially and deliberately breached their most 
important requirements, and they have not changed behaviour after receiving previous 
sanctions”). 
 
 
 13 
 
4.  Policies 
While there are many policies that impact on employment and unemployment 
including macroeconomic policies (both monetary and fiscal), in this paper we largely 
focus on active labour market policies (welfare-to-work programmes) reflecting this 
project’s focus on social policy rather than economic policy. These policies are 
designed to boost employment and reduce unemployment/economic inactivity by 
helping those without work move into work and stay in work. These are the policies 
for which we have information on expenditure and we can make some assessment of 
the impact of policies and resource allocation on outcomes. We will also touch on 
developments in the area of low wage employment – in particular the national 
minimum wage – and self-employment as these two areas have come under the 
political spotlight over the course of the Coalition government’s term in office. 
 
The Coalition government’s approach to providing employment services to job 
seekers claiming out of work benefits can be divided into those that are effectively 
managed by Jobcentre Plus, usually made available to claimants at the start of a claim 
for out of work benefits, and the programme of support for longer term unemployed or 
those considered to face the greatest barriers to work. Sometimes the first phase is 
referred to as “Get Britain Working measures”, more recently “pre-Work Programme 
support”, and the second is the “Work Programme”. Claimants unable to secure 
sustained employment after two years on the Work Programme return to Jobcentre 
Plus and from April 2014 have had to participate in the Help to Work scheme. A brief 
description of these phases follows an outline of the two main out-of-work ‘active’ 
benefits and then we turn to a short discussion on programmes specifically designed to 
help young unemployed job seekers and disabled people. In this paper we will not 
cover the introduction of Universal Credit which has only partly been rolled out 
(12,000 claimants by August 2014) but it is the backdrop to many of the changes 
being made to benefit entitlement and conditionality (more information can be found 
in Hills, 2015). 
 
Unemployed people are entitled to apply for Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). If they 
have made sufficient National Insurance (NI) contributions they can claim 
contribution-based JSA for up to six months, if they have insufficient NI 
contributions, or their entitlement to contribution-based JSA has expired, they can 
claim income-related JSA. At the start of a claim individuals are required to attend a 
JSA interview and sign a Jobseeker’s Agreement (or in some cases a Claimant 
Commitment) which sets out steps required to find work and ways to improve chances 
of finding work. Claimants are then required to attend Jobsearch Reviews (‘sign-on’) 
every two weeks or when asked to do so, and are required to demonstrate that they 
have been actively searching for work. 
 
People who are ill or disabled and out of work can apply for Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) – introduced for new claims in 2008. They are required to undergo 
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a Work Capability Assessment7 (WCA) if on the basis of a paper-based assessment 
they are not assigned to the ESA support group (considered not to capable of work-
related activity). The outcome of a WCA determines whether a claimant is referred to 
JSA, assigned to a work-related activity group or to the support group. These 
assessments have been contracted out to a private provider - and their reliability has 
attracted wide ranging criticism. Individuals in the work-related activity group are 
required to attend regular interviews with an adviser and are given a prognosis in 
relation to the months before they would be expected to return to work; these can be 
short term (3-6 months) or as long as a year. People with existing claims for 
Incapacity Benefit, Income Support paid because of illness or disability and Severe 
Disablement Allowance when ESA was introduced, are gradually being migrated onto 
ESA. The process for reassessing all Incapacity Benefit claims through a WCA started 
in April 2011 and was due to complete by March 2014 but it has been beset with 
controversy. Initially Atos healthcare was awarded the contract in late 2010 but in 
March 2014 it was agreed that their contract with DWP would be terminated early 
amid high levels of criticism from many individuals and organisations about the 
quality and reliability of the assessments, a large share of decisions being overturned 
on appeal, the unnecessary stress and anxiety incurred by those undergoing the 
assessments and delays in assessments being made. The House of Commons Work 
and Pensions committee published a highly critical report in July 2014 concluding 
that: 
“the design of the ESA benefit and assessment process is so 
problematic, particularly in relation to the confusion and limitations of 
the outcome groups, that its inefficiencies and the detriment 
inappropriate decisions cause to claimants can only be resolved in a 
fundamental redesign of the ESA claims process over the next few 
years.” (HC 302, 2014; p49). 
The report also notes how changes over time have been associated with a fall in the 
share of ESA claimants assessed to be fit-for-work8 and an increase in the share 
assigned to the support group. The Government considerably underestimated the share 
of claimants they thought would be assigned to the support group; initially the 
Government estimated that 20% of IB claimants would be assigned to the support 
group but by Autumn 2013 the figure was around 70%. Maximus Health Services UK 
is due to start a three-year contract in March 2015 and in a recent interview they 
suggested that it could take them up to 18 months to deal with the backlog (Guardian, 
8th November 2014). 
 
To assist job seekers, DWP provides an internet based job matching service through 
Universal Jobmatch which was introduced in 2012 replacing a previous web-based 
                                              
7
  Work Capability Assessments were introduced by the Labour Government in the Welfare 
Reform Act 2007. 
8
  “27% of new claimants were found fit for work in the period July to September 2013. This 
compares with 64% when ESA was introduced in 2008. For migrated IB claimants, the figure 
was 11%, down from 27% in the second quarter of 2012” (HC 302, 2014; p10). 
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vacancy posting/job search tool. Claimants can be required to register for and use 
Universal Jobmatch as part of their job seeking activities and use can be monitored by 
Jobcentre staff. Universal Jobmatch has been criticised for advertising bogus 
vacancies and fraudulent postings as well as being costly. However, having a readily 
accessible database of job vacancies to assist job seekers and a source from which 
advisers can draw from to present opportunities to them during Jobsearch Reviews is a 
necessary component of government funded employment services. 
 
Get Britain Working measures – Pre-Work Programme 
Most unemployed people have relatively short spells of unemployment and during this 
time they can be offered a variety of interventions to help them back into work. Some 
are compulsory and refusal to participate can result in benefit sanctions9. Get Britain 
Working measures are designed to support jobseekers, as part of the Jobcentre Plus 
offer, and were introduced between October 2010 and August 2011. These measures 
are in addition to regular meetings with Jobcentre advisers to discuss job opportunities 
and review jobseekers’ efforts in seeking work in line with their Jobseeker’s 
Agreement. Jobcentre Plus district managers are allowed to use their discretion to 
identify which measures to offer in their area. These interventions include: Work 
Clubs, Work Together, Enterprise Clubs, Work Experience, New Enterprise 
Allowance and sector-based work experience and each are outlined briefly below. 
 
Work Clubs 
These clubs provide unemployed and inactive people with a place to meet and 
exchange skills, find opportunities, make contacts, share experiences and receive 
support to help them in their return to work.  
 
Work Together 
This initiative encourages unemployed people to consider volunteering with the aim 
of improving employment prospects while looking for paid work. Jobcentre Plus 
advisers inform job seekers of local organisations that have agreed to support 
unemployed people in this way, steer them to online support and make them aware of 
specific opportunities. 
 
Enterprise Clubs 
These clubs are targeted at unemployed people interested in self-employment. The 
aim is to support the development of a network of locally-led, community-based 
support. Unemployed people interested in self-employment are provided with a place 
to meet and exchange skills, make contacts, share experiences, receive support and 
encourage each other to work through their business ideas. 
 
  
                                              
9
  Sanctions are not covered in detail in this paper although they are an important element of the 
Coalition’s benefit regime. 
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Box 2: Routes through claiming JSA and ESA and progression through welfare 
to work provision 
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Work experience 
Primarily designed to help young people aged 18-24 years who have been claiming 
JSA for three months (prior to becoming eligible for the Work Programme) gain 
experience and increase their chance of securing a job. Placements last 2-8 weeks 
(with some exceptions) and participants continue to receive benefit and are expected 
to continue to search for paid work. Introduced in January 2011 but since April 2012 
has been part of the Youth Contract (more below) although in some cases people over 
24 years can be offered a placement10. The scheme operates across Great Britain 
(GB). 
 
New Enterprise Allowance 
The New Enterprise Allowance (NEA) programme was developed to assist and 
support unemployed people who wanted to start up a business. It was launched in 
April 2011, rolled out across GB in phases between April and November 2011, for 
people aged 18 and over who had been claiming JSA for six months or longer. Since 
October 2012 JSA claimants aged 18+ are now eligible for NEA from the first day of 
their claim. From February 2013 lone parents on Income Support and some ESA 
claimants have also been able to access the programme.  
 
New Enterprise Allowance scheme is delivered by Lead Accountable Bodies 
(LABs)11 in each Jobcentre Plus (JCP) district on behalf of DWP. JCP refers eligible 
claimants who wish to start their own business, who then receive advice, guidance and 
support from volunteer business mentors or paid business advisers as they develop 
their business plan over a period of eight to twelve weeks and through the first six 
months of trading. Participants demonstrating that they have a viable business 
proposition with the potential for growth are able to access financial support 
consisting of a weekly allowance (£65 a week for the first 13 weeks followed by £33 a 
week for a further 13 weeks) and access to a loan to help with start-up costs (up to 
£1,000).  
 
Sector-based work academies 
Sector-based academy placements offer pre-employment training, work experience 
placements and a guaranteed job interview or an apprenticeship for recipients of JSA 
and ESA (work-related activity group) by employers in sectors with high volumes of 
local job vacancies. Participation is voluntary, although claimants may face a sanction 
                                              
10
  Initially the placements were voluntary but in February 2012 the government made 
attendance mandatory after the end of the first week on a placement - participants who drop 
out could be sanctioned – this proved so unpopular with employers that a number pulled out 
of the scheme (Toynbee, 2012; BBC News Online, 2012) and subsequently the government 
removed the mandatory element. 
11
  LABs bring together partners in an area to plan informal adult learning provision to meet 
local needs and support economic and social priorities. LABs manage the entire budget and 
the LABs payment model in relation to NEAs is determined by their performance based on 
the numbers who: start, complete the preparation stage, commence trading and complete 26 
weeks of trading (see, Atkinson et al., 2013 p.88 for details). 
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if they do not complete. The placements are available in England and Scotland and 
last no more than six weeks. 
 
Mandatory Work Activity and Skills Conditionality 
Jobcentre Plus advisers across Great Britain can require JSA and ESA (work-related 
activity group) claimants to attend a short work placement (4 weeks/30 hours a week) 
or work related activity to gain skills (Mandatory Work Activity). These participants 
continue to claim JSA and attend Jobsearch Reviews. The placements are sourced by 
contracted providers in organisations and institutions that are deemed to deliver a 
community benefit, for example charity shops and conservation projects. Claimants 
referred to MWA who do not comply are referred for a benefits sanction, with the 
severity of sanctions increasing with repeated non-compliance12.  
 
JSA and ESA claimants can also be required to undertake activities to address an 
identified skills need (Skills Conditionality). Some claimants are referred to the 
National Careers Service (in England) to assess skills needs and some directly to 
training which includes basic skills (English, numeracy, literacy, occupational skills, 
employability skills and English for Speakers of Other Languages).  
 
The Work Programme 
The aim of the Work Programme, introduced in June 2011, is to help long-term 
unemployed people and those considered to need the most assistance, to find and 
maintain paid work, reducing the time people spend claiming benefits. In comparison 
with the Flexible New Deal, which it replaced, there is greater involvement of private 
and third sector organisations on designing and delivering the interventions and a 
stronger emphasis on employment retention as a key goal. The design of the Work 
Programme which gives providers considerable freedom in terms of the choice of 
interventions to provide (the so-called ‘black box’) can be seen to represent a strong 
commitment to experimentation and a means of boosting private sector provision of 
employment services. The routes onto the Work Programme vary depending on which 
out-of-work benefit people qualify for and other personal characteristics such as age 
and whether or not they are assessed to require extra assistance in finding work. The 
diagram in Box 2 outlines the various routes that lead claimants to the Work 
Programme. Throughout their time on the Work Programme Jobcentre Plus continues 
to administer participants’ claims and throughout a claim participants are required to 
attend fortnightly Jobsearch Reviews (sign-on) including demonstrating that they 
continue to meet the conditions set out in their Jobseeker’s Agreement. 
 
JSA claimants aged 18-24 years who are still without paid work after nine months13, 
twelve months for those aged 25 and over and after three months for those considered 
to be most disadvantaged and in need of help, are referred by Jobcentre Plus advisers 
                                              
12
  This component of the Coalition’s employment policy has attracted considerable media 
attention due to its “workfare” features and a number of high profile employers have 
withdrawn from the scheme.  
13
  This is longer than the six months stated in the Coalition Agreement. 
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to the Work Programme. ESA claimants in the work-related activity group are also 
referred to the Work Programme. Initially ESA claimants with a short term prognosis 
of 3 months at the start, widened from October 2011 to include those with a 6 month 
prognosis and since October 2012 the eligible group was extended to include 
claimants with a 12 month prognosis (the prognosis denotes the length of time by 
which these claimants are assessed to be capable of work). All ESA claimants can 
volunteer to participate.  
 
Eighteen prime contractors hold between them 40 contracts with the DWP and 
manage around 700 subcontracts with a second tier of providers offering a range of 
services. They are largely paid according to the results that they achieve in terms of 
participants finding and remaining in work, although in recognition of front end costs 
a fixed attachment payment was initially paid but reduced in value until being 
eliminated from July 2014. The value of payments vary according to nine DWP 
defined payment groups which distinguish between those easier to help and those 
considered to be harder to help, with higher value payments being made for job 
outcomes for groups considered to be harder to help (see Box 3). They vary from 
£3,410 for a JSA claimant aged 18-24 (£3,300 for an ESA volunteer) to £13,120 for 
an ESA ex-Incapacity Benefit claimant (maximum payment, excluding attachment 
fee). Higher payments are made on the basis that greater savings will result from 
achieving job outcomes (in terms of benefit expenditure) for the harder to help groups 
and a recognition that providers will need to offer a higher level of support and greater 
value interventions to assist these individuals. Contractors can claim a job outcome 
payment when a participant has been in work for a cumulative period (3-6 months 
depending on payment group; 3 months for the harder to help groups) and sustainment 
payments for every four weeks a participant remains in work beyond the job outcome 
period for up to two years. The Work Programme contracts are time limited with the 
last referrals being made to contractors in March 201714 and payments possible until 
the final cohort completes the programme (up to four years after this date).  
 
Participants remain on the active stage of the Work Programme for a maximum of two 
years. If they have not found sustained employment during this time they return to 
Jobcentre Plus. From April 2014 all JSA claimants leaving the Work Programme 
without finding work have had to participate in the Help to Work scheme. This can 
include: taking part in community work placements, such as clearing up litter and 
graffiti in their local areas; attending daily signings at the Jobcentre until they find 
work; or for participants with multiple barriers to finding work, for example literacy 
or numeracy problems, intensive support is provided. 
 
  
                                              
14
 Initially contracts were for five years with the last referrals being made to contractors in March 
2016 but recently it emerged that provider contracts had been extended by 12 months 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmworpen/814/814.pdf (p14).  
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Box 3: Work Programme payment groups 
 
Group Claimant description Time of referral Basis1 Max payment 
(excl. attachment 
fee) 1 JSA 18-24 From 9 months M £3,410 
2 JSA 25+ From 12 months M £3,995 
3 JSA early entrant From 3 months M/V £6,200 
4 JSA (ex-IB) From 3 months M £6,200 
5 ESA – volunteer After WCA V £3,300 
6 New ESA After WCA M £5,900 
7 ESA (ex IB) Any time M/V £13,120 
8 IB and IS Any time V £3,825 
9 JSA prison leaver Immediately M £5,110 
Note 1: M=Mandatory, V=Voluntary 
 
Two groups are looked at in the following section where specific provision is 
designed to help groups of jobseekers in need of extra help. Youth unemployment had 
been growing prior to the recession (McKnight, 2009) and for a number of years there 
has been a growing concern about a group of young people who are not in education, 
employment or training (so called NEETs). The Youth Contract introduced by the 
Coalition government, is designed to address joblessness and economic inactivity 
among young people. First we examine in some detail provision for young people 
who qualify for the Youth Contract and then we turn our attention to specific 
provision made available to people who qualify for disability related out of work 
benefits but are considered to be capable of work in a limited capacity. This is a group 
facing some of the greatest challenges in terms of securing and progressing in 
employment and much has been done in recent years to increase the amount of 
support available to unemployed disabled people not all of which has been 
particularly successful. Some of this has been in the form of evaluation of people’s 
ability to work and the design of out of work benefits (introduction of the ESA), as 
well as tailor made active labour market programmes (New Deal for Disabled People), 
support for disabled people in work, and legislation to address discrimination in the 
work place (Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Equality Act 2010). The 
Coalition government has built on the existing policy platform and introduced some 
new elements that are outlined below. 
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Youth Contract 
The Youth Contract15, primarily targeted at 18-24 year olds, was launched in April 
2012 in response to stubbornly high levels of youth unemployment and inactivity. 
Three elements of the Youth Contract were provided and managed by the Department 
for Education (DfE), the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the 
DWP. The DfE element, aimed at engaging 16 and 17 year olds who are not in 
employment, education or training (NEET), was introduced in 2012 and this provision 
ends in March 2015. The DWP component incorporates some programmes already 
available through Jobcentres and the Work Programme with the aim of helping young 
unemployed people find and stay in work. The package includes funding for work 
experience (as above), Wage Incentives, additional advisor support, sector-based work 
academies (as above). Funding was made available for an extra 250,000 work 
experience placements or sector based academy places. The BIS component was 
Apprentice Grants for Employers available for eligible 16-24 year olds (£1,500 paid to 
employers over and above existing subsidies towards the cost of training). Up to 
40,000 places in small and medium sized enterprises (less than 250 employees) could 
be funded at a total cost of £60 million. 
 
Wage incentives were made available to employers, including to parts of the public 
sector. They were initially only available for Work Programme participants but since 
December 2012 all 18-24 year old claimants who had been claiming benefit for at 
least six months have been eligible (initially trialled in 20 areas from July 2012). This 
employment subsidy (lower for those working 16-29 hours per week - £1,137.50 
rather than £2,275) was paid to employers who employ an eligible young person for 
26 weeks. If the young employee leaves after 13 weeks, employers receive half of the 
subsidy. Work Programme providers and Jobcentre Plus staff are responsible for 
identifying eligible beneficiaries, recruiting employers and ensuring that jobs are 
eligible. The last cohort qualifying for this subsidy must have found work by 6th 
August 2014.  
 
The component of the Youth Contract managed by DfE, contracted providers to 
design and deliver services to 16-17 year olds not in education, employment or 
training (NEET) or identified as being at risk of NEET with very low levels of 
qualifications or no qualifications at all. Providers were paid according to results 
achieved in terms of (re)engaging these young people in education (with one 
exception which concentrated on apprenticeships). 
 
  
                                              
15
  The Youth Contract is also covered in Lupton (2015) Social Policy in a Cold Climate, 
Working Paper 14: The Coalition’s record on Further and Higher Education and Skills: 
Policy, Spending and Outcomes 2010-2015. 
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Specific active labour market programmes designed to assist people with 
disabilities 
 
Access to Work 
Access to Work (AtW) is a Jobcentre Plus grant scheme, which assists disabled 
people who are in or about to start paid employment or self-employment or for those 
participating in a Jobcentre Plus agreed Job/Work Trial16 and for young disabled 
people taking up a Work Experience placement or those receiving a New Enterprise 
Allowance. AtW was first introduced in 1994 and has been continued under the 
Coalition government. There is no fixed amount and awards are related to the support 
required. It is available to people who have a disability or health condition that is 
likely to last for 12 months or more.  
 
AtW provides both practical advice and support to disabled people and their 
employers, to help overcome barriers to work resulting from disability. Funding in the 
form of a grant is available to pay for identified additional disability related support 
(additional costs) required to assist the person to do their job over and above those 
costs associated with reasonable adjustments which the employer is legally required to 
make. This could help fund aids, adaptions, and additional costs of travel as well as a 
support worker.  
 
Work Choice 
Work Choice is a programme of support available to disabled people whose needs are 
not met through the Work Programme, Access to Work or workplace adjustments. It 
replaced WORKSTEP, Work Preparation and the Job Introduction Scheme in October 
2010. The Work Choice programme is delivered by providers who work with eligible 
participants through three different stages. The initial stage which can last for up to six 
months offers participants assistance with personal skills and work-related advice to 
help them move into supported or unsupported employment (a job that is independent 
of a Work Choice provider). The second stage, lasting up to two years, is available for 
those participants who have found paid employment (or self-employment) supported 
by Work Choice (16+ hours a week). The provider works with the employer and 
participant to identify and provide support required to start and continue working. The 
final stage, which has no time limit, provides participants with help to progress in 
their job and where appropriate, help them move into unsupported work. As with the 
Work Programme, prime providers can sub-contract with specialist second-tier 
providers to deliver the programme. Remploy, owned by the DWP, is also delivering 
Work Choice. 
 
                                              
16
  Under an agreement reached with Jobcentre Plus, employers are able to offer a jobseeker a 
work trial for 30 days prior to offering them a job. During this time the jobseeker continues to 
claim JSA/ESA and agrees to the work trial on a voluntary basis. There are no sanctions for 
non-completion the Work Trial and there is no compulsion for the jobseeker to accept any job 
offered at the end of the trial. 
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Disability Employment Advisors (DEAs) are responsible for referring eligible 
disabled people to the programme. Work Choice providers, including Remploy, can 
refer people to DEAs to be considered for the programme. Jobcentre Plus advisers can 
also refer JSA and ESA suitable claimants for DEA assistance and to be considered 
for Work Choice. Individuals can also self-refer.  
 
Providers receive an initial payment for each individual who starts Work Choice, a 
further payment if that individual obtains a job outcome, and a final payment if that 
job outcome is sustained – unsupported for at least 6 months. They are expected to 
provide certain elements of the normal AtW provision and participants moving into 
unsupported work can apply for AtW. 
 
Other areas of employment policy 
In other areas of employment policy, the government initiated a review of 
employment law – the Employment Law Review which is being led by BIS – 
continuing throughout the Coalition government’s term in office. There isn’t scope in 
this paper to cover this review in detail which has resulted in important changes such 
as the removal of the default retirement age, the introduction of the right to request 
flexible working and changes to rules around unfair dismissal and large-scale 
redundancies. Details can be found in the Employment Law Review annual updates 
published by BIS17. In March 2011 the Hutton Review of Fair Pay in the public sector 
was published (Hutton, 2011). Among other things the review examined the case for 
introducing the ‘20 times’ multiple in the public sector – the proposal that no public 
sector worker should earn over 20 times more than the lowest paid person in their 
organisation. Despite the fact that the Coalition agreement stated that the review 
would look at how to implement the ‘20 times’ multiple, the Hutton Review 
concluded that such a cap would not be helpful and deemed it to be inoperable across 
a diverse public sector workforce. Hutton instead recommended that every public 
body should annually publish the multiple of top to median pay. The local government 
transparency code (DCLG, 2014) requires local government to publish pay multiples 
on their website, defined as the ratio between the highest paid taxable earnings for the 
given year and the median figure of the whole of the authorities workforce.  
 
From 30 June 2014 the legal right to request flexible working was extended to all 
workers who have been with their current employer for a minimum of 26 weeks.  
 
Agency Worker Regulations 2010, which built on the 2008 Temporary and Agency 
Workers (Equal Treatment) Bill, gives temporary agency workers a number of rights 
from the first day of any assignment. These are the right to full access to staff facilities 
(such as canteen, childcare facilities, etc) and access to information on employer’s 
internally advertised job vacancies. After 12 weeks in the same job, agency workers 
have a right to equal treatment in relation to entitlements to pay and other basic 
working conditions (annual leave, rest breaks etc) and pregnant agency workers are 
allowed to take paid time off for ante-natal appointments during an assignment. 
                                              
17
  http://bis.ecgroup.net/Publications/EmploymentMatters.aspx  
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The Equality Act 2010 replaced the Equal Pay Act 1970, Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, Race Relations Act 1976, Disability Discrimination Act 1995, Employment 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003[5] and the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 
2006. It requires equal treatment in access to employment as well as private and 
public services. Employers are required to make reasonable adjustments to their 
workplaces to overcome barriers experienced by disabled people. 
 
Since April 2013 all employment law except discrimination law has been taken out of 
the scope of Legal Aid. In 2013 individuals deciding to take a claim to an 
Employment Tribunal have had to pay issue fees and hearing fees which vary for 
different types of claims. For example, claims for breach of contract, covering 
redundancy and unauthorised deductions, cost claimants £390 in fees, and 
discrimination, unfair dismissal, breach of part-time workers regulation attract fees of 
£1,50018. Since April 2014 most claimants have been required to attempt to settle their 
dispute through ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service) before 
applying to an employment tribunal. 
 
In the 2014 Budget the Coalition Government announced proposals to tackle the 
activities of employment intermediaries avoiding tax, either by being based offshore, 
or, of particular relevance to the construction industry, by disguising employment as 
self-employment. There is no statutory definition of employment/self-employment 
status and where classification is challenged it is settled by judicial decisions based on 
a number of criteria in relation to workers’ autonomy and payment for labour services. 
An assessment of the scale of false definition of self-employment status for the 
purposes of avoiding tax and national insurance liabilities was undertaken by the 
Labour Government in 2009. This revealed a continuing problem in the construction 
sector in particular with employers and intermediaries using false self-employment 
status for financial gain. Workers lose out in terms of sick pay, holiday pay and 
redundancy pay and can find that they face a large unexpected income tax bill. While 
no policies designed to clamp down on such practices were agreed under the Labour 
Government, the Coalition Government commissioned a further consultation in 2013 
to look specifically at the use of intermediaries to facilitate false self-employment in 
the construction sector and elsewhere (especially driving, catering and security). 
Changes designed to clamp down on the practice were introduced in the Finance Bill 
2014.  
 
Summary 
The Coalition government has redesigned welfare to work programmes available 
through Jobcentre Plus and contracted providers. These providers have been given 
more freedom in terms of designing the interventions they offer to help job seekers 
find and remain in work, but these changes can be seen largely as an evolution rather 
than a revolution. The Work Programme has its roots very firmly in the 
                                              
18
  There exists a remission scheme which reduces or removes the fee entirely for some people 
who are receiving certain benefits or whose income is below a given level.  
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recommendations made by the Freud Review, commissioned by the Labour 
government in 2007, which were picked up in the 2008 White Paper and to a large 
part incorporated in the design of the Flexible New Deal. This continuity can be seen 
by the appointment of Lord Freud as Minister for Welfare Reform by the Coalition 
government in 2010. The emphasis on longer term provision and a payment and 
incentive structure that provides greater rewards for achieving employment retention 
and helping the most disadvantaged are welcome developments. Some of the changes 
have not been well received – such as the attempt to make work experience 
placements mandatory. The process set up to assess and re-assess eligibility for out of 
work benefits on the basis of limited capability to work has attracted widespread 
criticisms due to the quality and reliability of assessments, delays and unnecessary 
stress and anxiety inflicted on claimants. It is clear that the Government over 
estimated the share of existing IB claimants who are capable of work in a limited 
capacity. 
 
5.  Spending 
Unlike some of the other policy areas covered in this project, changes over time in 
expenditure on employment policy either in real terms or as a percentage of GDP 
cannot be interpreted simply as increases or decreases in provision; at least on a per 
recipient basis. The reason for this is that spending on employment policy tends to 
increase when unemployment increases and decline when unemployment declines as 
most expenditure on employment policy is allocated to active labour market policies. 
This makes meaningful interpretation of expenditure figures in this policy area more 
challenging at times because falling expenditure can be due to falling need 
(unemployment) rather than falling provision for those in need.  
 
Total spending on employment policy reported in the Public Expenditure Statistical 
Analyses (PESA) data19 is shown in Figure 1 both in real terms and expressed as a % 
of GDP. These series show how spending on the New Deal programme boosted 
expenditure on employment policy in the first three years of the Labour government 
1997/98-2001/02 which was initially funded by a one-off £5 billion windfall tax on 
privatised utility companies. As employment continued to rise and unemployment fell 
throughout much of Labour’s time in government, expenditure on employment policy 
as a share of GDP fell back to 0.23% in 2007/08. The economic recession led to an 
increase in expenditure from 2008/09 as unemployment increased reaching a peak of 
£4.8 billion in 2010/11. The increase in unemployment led to an increase in the share 
of GDP being spent on employment policy to 0.29% in 2009/10 and 0.31% in 
2010/11. Expenditure fell sharply in 2011/12 to £3.3 billion before increasing in 
2013/14 to £3.7 billion (0.2% GDP). The fall between 2010/11 and 2011/12 (£1.3 
billion, 27%) is associated with the shift to a deferred payment scheme under the 
Work Programme whereby contracted providers are paid largely on the basis of 
                                              
19
  Definition of how expenditure on employment policy is classified in the PESA data according 
to the UN’s Classification of the Functions of Government can be found in Annex 1. 
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outcomes, some of which is reflected in the increase in 2013/14. Assuming that the 
Work Programme delivers expected results, expenditure on employment policy over 
the next few years will increase. 
 
Figure 1: Spending on employment policy 1997/98 to 2013/14 (real terms 2009/10 
price levels (£billions) and % GDP) – unemployment rates (ILO measure) 
 
Source: Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) (2014 and 2011), Tables 4.3 and 4.4; 
Unemployment Data Table UNEM01, ONS (June, 2014). 
Notes: (1) Real terms figures are the nominal figures adjusted to 2009-10 price levels using GDP 
deflators from the Office for National Statistics (released 9 December 2013). (2) Expenditure 1997/98 
cash basis, from 1998/99 onwards accruals basis. (3) ILO unemployment rates UK (16-64 years) from 
Mar-May quarter LFS (seasonally adjusted) (Table UNEM01, ONS). (4) On advice from HMT the 
figure for 2007/08 is taken from PESA 2011 series all other figures are from PESA 2014. Figures are 
likely to be revised in future releases. 
 
6.  Inputs and outputs 
Unlike for some of the other areas covered in this project there is not an official 
readily available set of statistics on inputs and outputs for employment policy. The 
Atkinson Review into the measurement of government output and productivity 
(Atkinson, 2005) advocated the use of direct output indicators rather than the previous 
convention of measuring the real monetary value of inputs. Ideally the indicators 
should measure the incremental impact of the services on client outcomes.  
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For the range of active labour market programmes covered in this paper we would 
ideally like to have measures of the number of people receiving employment services, 
the various inputs required to deliver these services such as the time spent by various 
advisers, support workers, mentors, trainers, etc., and the impact of incremental 
increases in employment directly resulting from the services provided (this could be 
measured in a variety of ways such as estimating the impact in terms of savings due to 
reduced benefit expenditure (current and future) and wider benefits such as health). 
Many employment services are now contracted out to the private sector (Work 
Programme) and detailed information on inputs is not available. The DWP published a 
set of productivity estimates in March 2014 (DWP, 2014a) and although these mainly 
cover the department as a whole there is some information on inputs and outputs for 
employment programmes that we will draw on here. 
 
DWP estimates input volume indirectly by deflating expenditure rather than directly 
measuring inputs. Following the recommendations of the Atkinson Review, only 
Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) spending is included within the inputs for the 
calculation of productivity (administrative costs and most programme expenditure but 
benefit expenditure is excluded). DEL spending includes: pay and pensions costs of 
staff employed; current expenditure on goods and services; and ‘consumption’ in 
respect of capital assets (depreciation). It is not clear how the Work Programme 
funding DEL/AME switch will affect these estimates because instead of funding the 
programme directly via departmental expenditure (as was the case with past welfare to 
work programmes), the Work Programme is funded from the money saved from 
future benefit spending as people find work (the DEL/AME switch). Therefore the 
funding comes from Annual Managed Expenditure (AME) which is used to pay 
welfare benefits, instead of the Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL). 
 
Unfortunately input figures are not published separately for employment programmes 
although DWP report that the large fall in inputs observed in 2011/12 (27% decrease) 
was largely driven by a switch to payment by results in many of the employment 
programmes and therefore this input (expenditure) is effectively being deferred to a 
later date. 
 
DWP output estimates are available separately for employment programmes. The 
recession resulted in increasing demand for DWP output as the number of people out 
of work and claiming JSA increased. The switch to payment by results in many 
employment programmes 2011/12 also had an impact on DWP output as within the 
estimates of output the contracts to external providers are treated on an output=inputs 
basis. This is shown in Table 1 as a fall in the expenditure share on employment 
programmes from 23.4% in 2010/11 to 14.8% in 2011/12.  
 
Output indices by group are also published by DWP (DWP, 2014a); the output indices 
are set to 100 in 2007/08 and changes are quantified relative to output in that year. 
The figures show a steady growth in output for ‘Operations – labour market’ 
(delivery of Jobcentre Plus services such as Jobsearch Reviews and interventions 
delivered by Jobcentre advisers), increasing from 189.6 in 2010/11, 196.1 in 2011/12 
 28 
 
and 201.6 in 2012/13. In contrast output measures for ‘Employment programmes’ fell 
from 235.6 in 2010/11 to 114.3 2011/12 and then to 96.4 in 2012/13, again reflecting 
deferred payments by switching to the payment by results system to contracted 
providers. 
 
Table 1: Expenditure shares by output group, 2007/08 to 2012/13 (Percentages) 
 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Operations – labour 
market 
22.8 25.6 24.5 26.1 26.2 27.2 
Employment 
programmes 
11.0 14.2 17.7 23.4 14.8 13.4 
 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions productivity estimates 2012/13 (Table 1; DWP, 2014a) 
 
There is some detailed information on costs of inputs, the volume of people using the 
services and an estimate of transaction costs for those provided by the DWP but time 
series are not readily available.  
 
Here we don’t consider costs associated with setting up initial out-of-work benefit 
claims or the costs in terms of maintaining those claims but show the costs associated 
with providing direct employment advice services to these claimants. DWP publish 
information on Jobsearch adviser interventions and Jobsearch Reviews. Without 
comparable time series it is not possible to assess whether or not productivity has 
improved or costs have fallen but if this series is continued it should be possible to 
conduct this type of assessment in the future. 
 
Table 2: Published inputs and associated costs for DWP provided employment 
advice services (2012/13) 
 Transactions per year Total costs Costs per 
transactions 
Job search adviser 
interventions 
24.7m £1.26bn £51.00 
Job search reviews 32.4m £227m £7.00 
 
Notes on costs: (1) Job search adviser interventions - Advisers provide support not just to clients on 
JSA, but also those in receipt of other benefits like ESA and Income Support. (2) Job search reviews - 
This process is designed to make sure claimants have been looking for work by reviewing their job 
search activity. The costs exclude any action arising during the review that relates to benefit, like 
taking signatures or a change in circumstances; these are covered under 'JSA: claims maintained'. 
The costs are for the financial year 2012 to 2013. They are aggregated and averaged to give a cost per 
intervention and this is presented on a fully absorbed basis but excluding investment (change) costs. 
Source: https://www.gov.uk/performance/transactions-explorer/department/dwp/by-transactions-per-
year/descending  
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Information on outputs is available on the number of people referred to or 
participating in the range of pre-Work Programme interventions. While official 
statistics are provided on the outputs for most of the programmes, the period to which 
they refer varies making it difficult to provide a coherent assessment of outputs across 
all government funded active labour market programmes. These volumes can be 
found in Annex 2. Here we focus on the more complete set of statistics available for 
the Work Programme. 
 
The number of referrals to the Work Programme was high in its first year due to the 
stock of claimants previously engaged in the Flexible New Deal being referred in 
large volumes to the Work Programme in June and July 2011 (Table 3), creating 
challenges for the new Work Programme Providers. Referral volumes have fallen over 
time as they became aligned with the flows of claimants reaching the qualifying point 
in their claim. This point varies for different types of claimants (type of benefit, 
different age groups for JSA claimants, if they are identified as requiring early 
intervention). Individuals can only be referred to the Work Programme once. These 
factors along with falling unemployment rates have resulted in falling referrals over 
time. As the Work Programme is time limited (last cohort of referrals will be made in 
March 2016) providers have had to manage the bulge of referrals at the start of the 
programme and during the first two years of their contract for provision and then a 
fairly long tail as the final cohorts progress through the programme. 
 
Table 3: Referrals to the Work Programme and attachments (Thousands) 
 Referrals Attachments 
Year 1 total June 2011-March 2012 687.16 644.17 
Year 2 total April 2012-March 2013 512.27 515.42 
Year 3 total April 2013-March 2014 348.61 354.46 
Year 4 (part) March 2014-Sept 2014 107.12 107.24 
Total  1,655.16 1,621.82 
 
Source: DWP Work Programme Official Statistics (December 2014) 
Notes: Attachment occurs when providers contact the claimant. Difference between referrals and 
attachments in any given period can occur due to time lags. Providers are required to contact and 
engage individuals in attachment activity within 15 working days of a referral. 
 
As noted earlier there have been changes to the composition of referrals, including the 
extension to ESA claimants with a 12 month prognosis (assessed to be work ready in 
12 months) while initially only those with a 3 month prognosis were referred. There 
was a much greater share of JSA claimants in the early cohorts compared to later 
cohorts (Figure 2). More recent cohorts have higher shares of ‘harder to help’ 
claimants who attract higher payments for the providers both in terms of attachment 
fees, during the period that they were payable, and job outcome and sustainment 
payments but the share of these groups expected to find work is considerably lower. 
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Figure 2: Composition of monthly Work Programme referrals by month of 
attachment and payment group 
 
 
Source: DWP Work Programme Statistics to September 2014: author tabulation using DWP 
tabulation tool. 
 
Summary 
It is difficult to make a meaningful assessment of inputs and outputs for employment 
policy as the statistics are not readily available. In addition, inputs and outputs are 
affected by changes in ‘demand’ for employment services – when unemployment 
increases so too does employment policy provision. Changes in payment models, such 
as the switch to a deferred method of payment for providers of the Work Programme, 
mean that a longer span of data is required to assess changes in outputs relative to 
changes in inputs and therefore how this impacts on productivity. 
 
7.  Outcomes Part I 
In this section we examine employment policy outcomes by looking at the numbers of 
people or share of participants in active labour market programmes who went on to 
find/sustain work. We draw on evaluation evidence where this information is 
available to report estimates of how much can be attributed to the interventions. We 
also look at broader measures such as flows off out-of-work benefits. 
 
The Work Programme 
We begin with the Work Programme. Figure 3 shows the share of Work Programme 
participants who had spent at least three/six cumulative months in work by the end of 
the first year on the programme for all claimants starting in a given month and 
separately for four of the nine “payment groups”. The chart is intentionally drawn on 
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100% y-axis scale to demonstrate the small proportion of participants who achieve a 
job outcome over this period. Less than 10% of each cohort entering the programme 
in its first seven months had achieved a defined job outcome; well below minimum 
expected levels. Minimum expected levels, set by DWP, vary for different payment 
groups and some have been revised down over time. The composition of monthly 
intakes therefore affects DWP’s estimates of minimum expected levels for different 
cohorts and according to official statistics the Work Programme is achieving slightly 
above minimum expected levels for more recent cohorts. DWP state that minimum 
expected levels are based on expected movement into employment in the absence of 
the Work Programme (DWP, 2014b). In guidance to Work Programme providers, 
DWP bases minimum performance levels for four payment groups (JSA 18-24, JSA 
25+, ESA 3/6 month prognosis, ESA 12 month prognosis) on an estimate of the 
proportion of claimants who would have achieved a job outcome in the absence of any 
intervention (based on an analysis of historical data), plus 10%20. It is not clear from 
the documentation if this is the same procedure used for calculating minimum 
expected levels in DWP Work Programme Official Statistics which simply states that 
“Minimum expected level is based on expected movement into work without the 
programme” (DWP 2014b), which might or might not include the “plus 10%”. 
However, the expectation was that providers would significantly exceed minimum 
levels. 
 
In the latest set of Quarterly Work Programme National Statistics to September 2014 
(DWP, 2014b) the Department states that its minimum expectation is that a little over 
1 in 9 of all participants will have achieve a job outcome at the 12 month point. 
Following a slow start, no doubt hindered by the speed at which the programme was 
introduced and the large stock of claimants referred to providers transferring from the 
Flexible New Deal in the first couple of months, the share of claimants achieving a 
job outcome has improved21 but minimum expected levels are considerably below the 
level of performance the Government initially expected the programme to achieve. 
While the share of participants achieving a job outcome at this point have improved 
over time, outcomes for the highest performing group (JSA claimants aged 18-24) 
have plateaued since April 2013 (21-22%).  
 
The separate groups identified in Figure 3 shows the higher rates of job outcomes 
achieved for JSA claimants than for ESA claimants, despite the fact that members of 
this group are only required to work for at least three months in total to meet this 
measure of performance, and payment incentives to providers delivering the 
programme are higher. ESA claimants who had previously been claiming Incapacity 
Benefit have very low rates and a recent National Audit Office evaluation (NAO, 
2014) raised concerns that providers are “parking” some of the hardest to help 
                                              
20
  Work Programme: DWP provider guidance; First published 1 December 2010, last updated 
13th January 2015. 
21
  DWP attribute the dip in performance in Nov/Dec 2012 to the large bulge of participants 
stretching the capacity of providers (DWP, 2014b), although it is not clear why this appears to 
have particularly impacted on JSA claimants aged 18-24.  
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participants due to low expected outcomes while focusing resources on easier to help 
individuals (“creaming”). The first component of DWP’s official evaluation of the 
Work Programme (Newton et al., 2012), while stating that it was too early to draw 
firm conclusions on the issue of “parking” did record evidence that some providers 
were engaging in this practice. The second DWP commissioned evaluation report 
(Lane et al., 2013) found that the differential pricing model was not sufficiently 
encouraging providers to support the most disadvantaged customers. Providers 
acknowledged that they were spending considerably less (an estimated 54% less) on 
this harder to help group than they initially intended (NAO, 2014) and less than they 
spend on JSA claimants. This could be seen as evidence that the financial incentives 
are considered to be too low for providers to spend resources on this group. For 
example, only 6.6% of new ESA claimants with a 12 month prognosis (assessed to be 
work ready in 12 months at the point that they are referred) who complete the Work 
Programme are expected to achieve a job outcome (Work Programme: DWP provider 
guidance) and therefore providers could well consider that the expected return on 
investments for this group is simply not high enough. More recent cohorts of new 
ESA claimants with a short prognosis in terms of the time in which they are expected 
to be work-ready (3 months or 6 months prognosis) are achieving higher levels of job 
outcomes after a year and DWP expects this to be sustained. The most recent cohort 
for which outcome information is available started the Work Programme in September 
2013 and after a year 10.3% had achieved a job outcome, up from 5.6% for those who 
started the Work Programme a year earlier. This is above the minimum expected level 
of 7.2% for this group. However, the gap between JSA claimants and new ESA 
claimants (excl. 12 month prognosis group) has widened since the start of the 
programme. 
 
If we look at outcomes after 2 years when participants have completed the active stage 
of the Work Programme (Table 4) we can see that many more participants go on to 
achieve job outcomes. These rates have also improved for later cohorts but for early 
cohorts were well below minimum expected levels. The recent NAO evaluation 
concluded that up to March 2014 the Work Programme, after a poor start, helped JSA 
claimants get into work and stay in work at about the same rate as previous welfare-
to-work schemes but this was well below the Department’s and contractor’s initial 
expectations when the programme was designed and when contractor’s submitted 
their bids (NAO, 2014). This should be evaluated in the context that the Coalition 
government introduced the Work Programme because it believed that existing welfare 
to work schemes performed poorly (described as “failing” in the Conservative 
Manifesto) and therefore the Work Programme needs to deliver results that are much 
better than minimum expected levels for it to be deemed a success against its 
objective. 
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Figure 3: The share of each monthly intake into the Work Programme with at 
least three/six months in work after a year – All claimants and for four of the 
nine payment groups 
 
Source: DWP Work Programme Official Statistics to September 2014. 
 
DWP accepts that initial performance expectations were set too high for some groups 
of ‘harder to help’ participants, overestimating the likely impact of the programme, 
and minimum expected performance levels have been reduced. The NAO evaluation 
found that up to March 2014 the Work Programme had not improved job outcomes 
for ESA claimants despite the fact that a key objective was to narrow the gap in job 
outcomes between easier and harder to help groups. ESA claimants who have 
completed the programme achieved job outcomes comparable with previous 
programmes (11%; compared to 12% under Pathways to Work) but considerably 
below initial expectations (22%) (NAO, 2014). At the time of the NAO evaluation 
DWP forecast that performance would rise to 14% by the end of the programme. 
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Table 4: Share of monthly intake into the Work Programme with at least 
three/six cumulative months in work after 2 years on the programme, and 
DWP’s minimum expected levels 
 
Actual Min. expected 
June 2011 22.3 26.2 
July 2011 21.4 26.2 
August 2011 21.6 26.2 
September 2011 22.2 26.3 
October 2011 22.4 26.3 
November 2011 21.6 26.2 
December 2011 22.7 26.1 
January 2012 25.1 26.2 
February 2012 27.0 26.1 
March 2012 27.5 26.1 
April 2012 28.7 26.1 
May 2012 28.2 26.2 
June 2012 28.6 26.2 
July 2012 27.9 26.2 
August 2012 28.2 26.2 
September 2012 27.9 26.2 
 
Source: DWP Work Programme Official Statistics to September 2014. 
 
The Work Programme was introduced not just to increase job outcomes but to 
increase the length of time participants spend in work and off benefits. Providers are 
paid for achieving job outcomes but also claim Sustainment payments for each period 
of four weeks that participants are continuously employed beyond the job outcome 
period. A maximum of 20 Sustainment payments can be claimed (13 for JSA 
claimants). This payment structure is designed to create an incentive for providers to 
find good job matches and provide in-work support to participants. Official DWP 
statistics show that 954,040 participants had completed the active stage of the Work 
Programme by the end of September 2014. Of these participants: 
 130,260 (13.7%) had entered employment and achieved the maximum number of 
sustainment payments. 
 90,220 (9.5%) had entered work and payments were still being made to the 
provider. 
 647,660 (67.9%) had returned to Jobcentre Plus; of whom 12.5% had managed to 
achieve a job outcome payment at some point during their period of participating 
in the programme (DWP, 2014b). 
In total 63.7% of participants who achieved a job outcome went on to achieve the 
maximum number of sustainment payments out of those who were in a position to 
achieve this maximum (DWP 2014b). With 28% of recent cohorts achieving a job 
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outcome this means that we could expect that around 18% of participants will go on to 
find long term sustainable employment. If we assume that the sustainment rate can be 
applied across different payment groups (this is unlikely) and use these figures along 
with DWP’s minimum expected outcomes for different payment groups and the 
maximum payments shown in Box 3 (above) we estimate that providers would have 
on average £719 to spend on an Employment and Support Allowance (ex-Incapacity 
Benefit) participant and an average of £685 on a Jobseeker’s Allowance participant 
over the two years of the programme and during continuing support while in work. 
These figures would be a little higher because some of the remaining 10% will 
achieve some sustainment payments. However, once a reasonable degree of profit is 
factored in it is clear that providers have very limited funds available to assist 
participants back into work and it is hard to see how this would be sufficient to 
provide the level of assistant required particularly for those with the greatest need for 
assistance. It is perhaps not surprising that providers are looking to cross subsidise 
between groups and to engage in “parking” and “creaming”. 
 
It is not easy to draw any firm conclusion from the official published Work 
Programme statistics on employment sustainment without a quantitative evaluation. 
The NAO evaluation concludes that the Work Programme appears to be as effective 
as previous programmes in keeping people in work for a sustained period but 
outperforms previous programmes for JSA claimants aged 18-24. 
 
The Government has been criticised for flaws in the design of measures of Providers’ 
performance used to establish incentive payments to reward high performance (NAO, 
2014). It is estimated that in 2014-15 £13 million will be paid out in incentive 
payments; a more accurate measure of high performance would have resulted in a 
payment of £6 million. Even the worst performing providers qualify for a high 
performance incentive payment due to flaws in the measure. DWP estimate that its 
total potential exposure up to the end of the programme is almost £61 million instead 
of £17 million that would be due if a more accurate measure had been defined, 
representing financial waste of £44 million. However, the Work Programme design 
has meant that there is lower financial risk for government due to the payment-by-
results model. The lower than expected performance has reduced the cost of the 
programme due to fewer outcome and sustainment payments, lowering contractors’ 
profits relative to what they expected. Cost per outcome (based on attachment, job 
outcome and sustainment payments but excluding high performance incentive 
payments) between June 2011 and March 2014 is in line with what the Department 
expected at the start of the programme. The DWP releases some financial information 
on the Work Programme but states that: 
“It is not yet possible to assess the value for money of the Work 
Programme as it has been designed as a 5 year programme. A full 
evaluation of the programme will be completed, including value for 
money, with the analysis expected to be completed by the end of 2014.” 
(DWP, 2013a); 
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but not published at the time of writing this paper. In the interim, the NAO report that 
based on DWP’s own modelling the total costs of the Work Programme (June 2011 to 
March 2020) will be around 2% less than for previous schemes delivering roughly 
similar levels of performance (NAO, 2014).  
 
Rates of moving off JSA and ESA 
Taking a broader look at JSA and ESA we reproduce some of the statistics that DWP 
publish as part of their transparency measures (DWP 2014c), to assess DWP 
performance. We look at rates of people moving off benefits, JSA and ESA; computed 
as the share of a cohort of people starting a claim for benefit in the same month who 
had stopped receiving the benefit so many weeks later22. For JSA the cut-off is 52 
weeks, for ESA the cut-off is 65 weeks (16 months). The vast majority of JSA 
claimants (around 90 per cent) were no longer receiving JSA a year after starting their 
claim (Figure 4). This compares with 94% of JSA claimants who started a claim for 
JSA before the crisis in April 2007 (Hills, 2014). The share falls for claims starting 
between August 2010 and September 2011; 86.6 per cent of JSA claimants starting 
their claim in February 2011 had left JSA by February 2012. As we shall see in the 
next section their claims span part of the period of the downturn when unemployment 
was at its peak. A higher share of claimants had left JSA by 12 months after the claim 
start date for those starting their claim after September 2012. How much of this 
increase is due to the upturn in the economy and how much can be attributable to 
welfare to work programmes is difficult to judge. Some of these claimants will have 
entered the Work Programme before reaching 52 weeks either if they were aged 18-24 
years (after 9 months) or considered to be ‘harder to help’ (at any point). Anyone 
remaining on JSA after 12 months will have been referred to the Work Programme 
after June 2011 (for the cohorts in this figure that means all of those starting a claim in 
June 2010 who had not left JSA within 52 weeks). The ‘dip’ does also span the first 
year of the Work Programme and is consistent with the evidence shown above of 
reduced performance of welfare to work provision for JSA 18-24 year olds over this 
period. 
  
                                              
22
  DWP presents the series in a slightly different way showing the end month rather than the 
start month. 
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Figure 4: Share of JSA claimants who had left JSA by 52 weeks from month of 
claim start 
 
Source: DWP 2014c https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dwp-business-plan-transparency-
measures/dwp-business-plan-transparency-measures  
 
A different picture emerges for ESA claimants, for whom outcomes are measured 
after 65 weeks (16 months) (DWP, 2014c). Even with an additional 13 weeks a much 
lower share of ESA claimants had left ESA within the allotted time period; around 73 
per cent for cohorts starting their claim for ESA between September 2009 and April 
2011. There is a substantial fall with only around 50 per cent of ESA claimants 
leaving ESA for those who started their claim for ESA from around August 2011 
onwards (43% for the most recent cohort for which outcome information is available 
who started their claim for ESA in March 2013). This would suggest that government 
policy had become less effective at helping ESA claimants but the difficulty with 
using these statistics to assess performance of government policy is that there have 
been changes over time in the composition of claimants flowing onto ESA. ESA was 
introduced in October 2008 for all new claims for out-of-work benefit made by 
disabled people and from April 2011 a rolling programme began under which existing 
Incapacity Benefit claimants are being re-assessed using a Work Capability 
Assessment (WCA). The outcome of a WCA assessment leads to IB claimants being 
moved either onto JSA or ESA for those assessed to have a limited capability to work. 
There has been much controversy around WCAs and criticism from claimants, the 
media, the British Medical Association and the Public Accounts Committee (as 
described in Section 4 above). 
 
Due to the reassessment of existing IB claims some of the group classified as new 
ESA claimants will have been claiming disability related out-of-work benefit for some 
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from that of earlier cohorts of ESA entrants in terms of severity of disability and 
prospects of finding work. The fact that ESA claimants include both those in the 
work-activity group (limited capability to work) and those in the support group also 
affects the ability to use these statistics to assess government performance. It does not 
appear to be a transparent statistics and should at the very least be published alongside 
outcomes for entry cohorts making a fresh claim for benefit and excluding those 
transferring from another benefit. 
 
New Enterprise Allowance 
By the end of September 2014 60,480 out of the 115,750 people who have received 
mentoring through the New Enterprise Allowance programme commenced trading 
and started receiving a weekly allowance (Annex 1, table A3). DWP has published an 
analysis of the benefit status of the first cohort of people starting NEA between April 
and December 2011 (3,200 JSA claimants aged 18 and over who had been claiming 
JSA for 26 weeks) (DWP, 2013b). Their analysis of administrative data which tracked 
individual’s benefit status for 52 weeks following the start of receiving an allowance 
(ie commencing trading) found that 78% of this cohort remained continuously off 
benefit for 52 weeks23. Due to lack of more detailed information it is not possible to 
say if these people remained self-employed over this period as they could be off 
benefit for a variety of reasons including finding work as an employee and therefore 
this should be considered an upper limit estimate (in week 52 15% of the cohort were 
claiming an out-of-work benefit). It is also not possible to interpret this figure as a true 
assessment of the effectiveness of NEA as there will be a large degree of self-
selection into the programme and no counterfactual estimates are available.  
 
A qualitative evaluation of NEA reported positive overall views of the programme 
among providers (LAB staff), Jobcentre Plus representatives and mentors but more 
varied views, although ‘often’ favourable, reported by participants. The evaluation 
found that the most common type of enterprise being supported by NEA was a ‘sole 
trader’ set up to provide services such as gardening, hairdressing, or building. 
Participants were generally seeking to sustain themselves and their families rather 
than seeking to expand or grow a business; some notable exceptions of businesses that 
had grown significantly were also found (Atkinson et al., 2013). 
 
Mandatory Work Activity and Skills Conditionality 
An early impact analysis of Mandatory Work Activity (MWA) by the DWP, covering 
the first cohort of referrals between May 2011 and July 2011, estimated that MWA 
reduced the likelihood of claiming out-of-work benefit in the following 3 months by 
up to 5 percentage points (77% among referrals compared to 82% for non-referrals) 
but by 21 weeks there was no difference between the referral group and the non-
referral group (74%); suggesting that a higher rate of MWA participants subsequently 
                                              
23
  DWP estimates that 35% of all individuals who had been claiming JSA for six months or 
more and finished a claim for JSA in the same period were continuously off benefit for the 
following 52 weeks, and 43% were claiming an out-of-work benefit in week 52. There are no 
details on whether this cohort was aged 25 or over. 
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returned to out-of-work benefits. Although DWP stress that the impacts are likely to 
be underestimates due to issues in relation to selection (which could not be 
sufficiently controlled for in the methodology employed – propensity score matching) 
(DWP, 2012a). No quantitative evaluation is available for later cohorts to assess 
whether MWA has become effective. 
 
An evaluation of the Skills Conditionality pilot found no evidence of an impact on 
training, sanctions and early labour market outcomes for individuals who were 
identified through basic skills screening as having a potential skills need (Dorsett et 
al., 2011). However, the authors stress that there were serious implementation issues 
with the pilot which meant that the findings may not be a reliable indication of the 
success of Skills Conditionality implemented as intended.  
 
Youth Contract 
The three main interventions available to support young people into work under the 
Youth Contract include the Work Experience scheme, a Wage Subsidy scheme and an 
Apprenticeship incentive scheme. In addition, the DfE funded a component designed 
to re-engage young people aged 16/17 who were either not in education, employment 
or training or at high risk of entering this state on leaving education, through a system 
of intensive support delivered by contracted providers. The Government expects to 
spend £1 billion over the lifetime of the programme 2012/13-2014/15. Evaluation 
evidence of the DfE component found that the NEET rate was reduced by 1.8 
percentage points as a direct result of the intervention and cost benefit analysis 
estimated that the intervention was cost effective with a net benefit of £12,900 for 
each sustained re-engagement (Newton et al., 2013).  
 
Qualitative research conducted on the wage incentive scheme covering the views and 
experience of a sample of Work Programme providers, Jobcentre Plus staff and 
employers, found a generally positive response to the scheme (Jordan et al. 2013).. As 
stated in the evaluation report the aim of the wage incentive scheme was not to create 
new jobs but to give young people a better chance of being recruited to an existing 
vacancy (p3). Work Programme providers and Jobcentre Plus staff mainly reported 
that they did not believe wage incentives were creating new jobs nor encouraging 
employers to retain young employees who had qualified for the incentives but felt it 
made an important contribution to helping young people secure employment. 
However, 28% of employers interviewed reported that retention decisions had been 
influenced by the scheme. Nine percent of employers interviewed said they had 
created an extra vacancy and a further seven percent said that they wouldn’t have 
taken on a young person without the incentive. Without good quantitative evaluation 
evidence it is impossible to know whether or not the incentive changed the fortunes of 
the young people involved and if they simply displaced other equally disadvantaged 
job seekers. 
 
Summary 
The evaluation evidence for pre-Work Programme support which is delivered through 
Jobcentre Plus is very piecemeal and largely lacking. While these programme 
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interventions are inherently difficult to evaluate due to the lack of good counterfactual 
estimates – what outcomes would have been achieved in the absence of the 
programme or under a different regime – this lack of evidence makes it difficult to 
assess how successful these initiatives have been either as a way of assessing the 
Coalition government’s performance or to help guide future policy interventions in 
this area. Arguably the government was too hasty in terminating the Future Jobs Fund 
before the positive evaluation evidence was available (DWP, 2012b). More 
information is available on the performance of the Work Programme. This evidence 
suggests that performance was initially low, outcomes were not as good as the DWP 
or providers expected and below what was achieved under the Flexible New Deal. 
Since then performance has improved (although evidence suggests that it has 
plateaued for JSA 18-24 year old claimants) and DWP anticipates that this higher 
level of performance will continue. A number of concerns have been raised about the 
poor performance of the Work Programme in terms of helping those most 
disadvantaged and the gap between JSA and new ESA claimants (excl. 12 month 
prognosis) has widened. Incentive payments do not appear to be high enough for 
providers to invest sufficiently in this group of participants given the very low levels 
of expected outcomes and therefore very low rates of return. A recent NAO report 
concludes that the Work Programme has not managed to produce results better than 
the programmes that it replaced but they report that although there has been some 
financial waste, DWP estimate that overall the programme is expected to produce 
results on a lower cost basis and with a lower financial risk as a greater share of the 
risk is borne by providers. 
 
8.  Outcomes - Part II 
 
General labour market assessment 
In Outcomes - Part I we focused on an assessment of outcomes in relation to direct 
policy interventions and against defined aims set out by the Coalition government, but 
no review of a government’s labour market policy would be complete without a 
broader assessment of trends in employment, unemployment and earnings. This 
section is therefore devoted to examining the wider performance of the labour market 
and the evidence on how different groups have fared. Where appropriate these are 
linked to a discussion of relevant policy and interventions. It also takes a longer run 
view than the analysis in some of the other papers which are able to build on specific 
papers covering Labour’s term in office. 
 
To conduct this analysis we draw on statistics published by the ONS and supplement 
these with primary analysis of longitudinal information from the Labour Force Survey 
which provide a different perspective in terms of looking at labour market dynamics.  
 
Employment 
Employment among the working age population increased under the Labour 
government on a headcount basis from a little over 26 million (71%) in April-June 
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1997 to peak at around 29 million (73%) in April-June 2008, falling back to just over 
28 million (70%) January-March 2010 (ONS Labour Market Statistics, January 2015). 
Despite falling over the recession, by September-November 2014 employment under 
the Coalition government had increased to 30.8 million (73%). As the size of the 
working age population varied over this period the peaks and troughs in terms of the 
share of the working age population in employment occurred at slightly different 
times, with the lowest point occurring in July-September 2011 (70.2%) and a peak of 
73.1% occurring in January-March 2005. A larger share of total employment 
(population aged 16 or over) is now made up of people working part-time (self-
defined) than before the recession; increasing from 24.8% July-September 2007 to 
26.5% January-March 2014 (26.9% September-November 2014). Although average 
weekly hours of work24 have recovered since the recession; 32.1 prior to the recession 
(July-September 2007), 31.6 as the Coalition government took office (April-June 
2010) and 32.2 in the latest figures (September-November 2014). The total amount of 
actual hours worked in a week across all workers in the UK (aged 16+) has increased 
from 943.1 million prior to the recession (July-September 2007) to 992.6 million in 
the latest figures (September-November 2014)25. 
 
These figures show that employment in the UK has been remarkably resilient over the 
recession; in fact the main concern has been in terms of productivity levels rather than 
employment levels with output per hour remaining below pre-recession levels (ONS 
2014a). 
 
One type of employment growth that has been causing concern among many is the use 
of zero-hours contracts. These are contracts of employment that do not guarantee any 
hours of work and can be accompanied by an exclusivity cause ensuring that these 
employees are available whenever and for the number of hours the employer requires. 
The latest official estimates made by ONS based on the Labour Force Survey suggest 
that around 600,000 employees (around 2% of the workforce) have zero-hours 
contracts (April-June 1014) (ONS, 2014b). They also report that estimates from the 
ONS business survey suggest that in January 2014 there were 1.4 million employee 
contracts with no guaranteed hours of work. These different estimates arise due to 
differences in definitions, the fact that employees can hold more than one job (the LFS 
estimates are based on the status of employee’s main job) and the inherent difficulties 
in measuring these types of jobs. Recent studies have shown that zero-hours contracts 
have increased with some estimates suggesting that these types of contracts doubled 
between 2012 and 2013 but some of this increase may be due to a greater awareness 
of these types of contract and therefore an increase in survey respondents reporting 
(Alakeson and D’Arcy, 2014). Zero-hours contracts are more prevalent among 
younger and older workers, although most concentrated among younger age groups, 
for those working in low and middle skilled occupations and within the hospitality 
                                              
24
  Actual hours of work including paid and unpaid overtime in main and any second job. 
25
  All employment statistics taken from ONS Labour Market Statistics, January 2015 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/january-2015/index.html (last 
accessed 22 January 2015). 
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sector, although across all sectors the highest number of workers with zero hours 
contracts are working in the health and social work sector. On average these 
employees earn less on an hourly basis (ONS, 2014b; Alakeson and D’Arcy, 2014). 
No information seems to be available on the variability of hours of work for these 
workers and whether or not they differ substantially from similar workers holding a 
more traditional form of contract with at least some hours of work guaranteed. 
 
Unemployment and economic inactivity 
Prior to the economic crisis unemployment (ILO measure) had been fairly stable at 
around 5% of the working age population from about 2000 (Figure 5). The recession 
resulted in a sharp increase in unemployment from 5.2% in April 2008 to a peak of 
8.5% in August and September 2011. From the summer of 2013 unemployment has 
been falling steeply and the most recent unemployment figure is 6% (September – 
November 2014).  
 
A comparison between ILO and claimant count measures of unemployment show that 
these two rates have diverged26. This divergence starting before the economic crisis, 
from the middle of 2005, and was noted in McKnight (2009) and McKnight and 
Tsang (2013) where a much longer time series compared trends dating back to the 
early 1970s. The longer run series showed that a significant gap also opened up during 
the early 1980s recession but the more recent gap is even greater; although the gap 
between the two measures has not widened under the Coalition government. Not all 
unemployed people qualify for unemployment benefits and, as noted earlier, there had 
been a concern that there was an incentive for governments to move people onto 
benefits that don’t count towards the claimant count measure. However, as the 
claimant count is no longer the official measure of unemployment, and the focus of 
recent policy has been to try and move IS and IB claimants onto JSA, this is unlikely 
to be an explanation and, as we will see below, inactivity rates did not change very 
much over the recession. What it does tell us is that a growing share of the 
unemployed are not in receipt of unemployment benefits which is likely to have had a 
negative impact on household income. Possible explanations are that there is an 
increasing share of unemployed people who are not able to claim contribution-based 
                                              
26
  There are technical differences in both the numerator and the denominators of these two 
measures of unemployment. For the ILO measure individuals are counted as unemployed if 
they are out of work but (i) have been looking for work in the past four weeks and (ii) are 
available to start work in the next two weeks. The rate is computed by dividing this number 
by the economically active working age population (in work or unemployed). The Claimant 
Count measure counts individuals who are claiming JSA on the second Thursday of each 
month (the "count date") and the rate is computed by dividing this number by the claimant 
count plus total workforce jobs. Total workforce jobs (TWJ) series is mainly compiled from 
surveys of businesses. TWJ series estimates a higher number of jobs than are estimated using 
the LFS (not all of which can be explained – see Chandler, 2014). As the number of people in 
work is likely to be lower than the total number of jobs (multiple job holding), these two 
factors alone will mean that the claimant count measure will estimate a lower rate of 
unemployment than the ILO measure. 
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JSA27 and do not qualify for income-based JSA as a result of other sources of 
household income (such as having a partner in work) or that unemployment increased 
by more among young people who do not qualify for JSA (16-17 year olds) or those 
who do not qualify due to migration status. We will examine this further below when 
we look at trends in workless households and unemployment rates for different age 
groups. 
 
Figure 5: ILO and claimant unemployment rates (%) and the percentage point 
(pp) gap between the two rates 
 
 
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, January 2015 (Tables A02 and CLA01) 
 
Male inactivity also increased a little (particularly October 2008-October 2009) (not 
shown) while inactivity rates among women continued to follow their historical 
downward trend throughout the period (Figure 6). The overall rates of unemployment 
were lower than many anticipated given the severity of the recession and on the basis 
of previous recessions (peak of early 90s recession 10.8% (1993:Q1); peak of early 
80s recession 12% (1984:Q2/Q3)) (McKnight, 2009). And one of the puzzles of the 
recent recession is why inactivity rates increased in the US but remained largely 
unchanged in the UK. As we will see later, part of the explanation is that wages fell, 
allowing employers to reduce the cost of labour by reducing the price of labour rather 
than the quantity.  
 
                                              
27
  Either because their National Insurance contributions are not sufficient for them to qualify for 
this element of JSA or they have exhausted their six month entitlement. 
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Figure 6: Trends in unemployment and inactivity rates (%) – working age 
population 
 
 
Source: Data from ONS Labour Market Statistics, December 2014 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/december-2014/index.html (last accessed 
8 January 2015), based on Labour Force Survey. 
 
Another explanation is that, unlike in the previous two major recessions, there has not 
been large scale sectoral restructuring. Recessions typically accelerate the rate of 
restructuring and sectoral change. A simple look at the distribution of employment 
across sectors (Figure 7) shows no dramatic restructuring although there were changes 
in the share of workers employed across sectors over the recession; in fact the greatest 
changes occurred in the 10 years preceding the recession. For example, an increase in 
the share of workers in education, human health and social work activities (areas 
partly protected from public expenditure cuts) with declines in construction and 
manufacturing; although manufacturing employment stabilised soon after the 
recession (see also, Plunkett and Pessoa (2013 p10) for an analysis of winners and 
losers among UK industries over the crisis). In the early 1980s recession there was a 
large shift in the industrial structure away from manufacturing, large scale industry 
and mining towards service sectors, and this process continued in the early 1990s 
recession. The economy was in good shape in the run up to the 2007/08 crisis and 
arguably this was an important contributory factor in explaining the resilience of 
employment over the recession. The labour force is also better qualified, arguably 
more flexible and adaptable (including as we shall able to pursue self-employment 
options where employment opportunities are reduced) and labour market institutions 
are weaker. That is not to say that change and restructuring has not occurred and it 
might be some time before a proper assessment can be made.  
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Figure 7: Trends in the UK distribution of employment by industry sector – 
1997-2014 
 
 
Source: ONS EMP13: Employment by Industry (Labour Force Survey) – Reference Tables 
Notes: The breakdown by industry sector for Q1 2009 onwards is not entirely consistent with those of 
previous quarters. This is because:  LFS data on industrial activity were coded directly to SIC 1992 
for all quarters up to and including Q4 2008 and then mapped to the new industrial classification, SIC 
2007, according to the assumed relationship between the two classifications; (b) data for Q1 2009 
onwards have been coded directly to SIC 2007; and (c) a new, automatic coding tool was introduced 
in January 2009. The effect of these changes on the time series was significant for some of the 
industry sectors shown. Consequently some adjustments have been made to the pre-2009 estimates to 
account for the estimated combined effects of the new classification and the new coding tool. This 
also means that the pre-2009 estimates in this table are not the same as those obtained from LFS 
microdata. 
 
Despite this fairly rosy overall picture, the impact of the recession was far from even. 
One of the groups that suffered most was young people who experienced a contraction 
in employment. This could be due to the fact that there was less opportunity to reduce 
their wages, as wages are typically lower among young people and employers are able 
choose more experienced workers for the same rate of pay in a slack labour market. It 
is also harder for this group to pursue self-employment opportunities with more 
limited access to capital, less experience of work and life more broadly.  
 
Youth unemployment among economically active 16-17 year olds had already started 
increasing prior to the recession; increasing from around 20% (up to 2003) to around 
29% just prior to the economic crisis (July-September 2007) (Figure 8). Some of this 
is linked to the fact that most 16 and 17 year olds are in some form of education or 
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training and it is those who are most disadvantaged and facing the greatest challenges 
to securing employment who are searching for work. The problem is made worse by 
the fact that apart from in exceptional circumstances these young people don’t qualify 
for out-of-work benefits and don’t qualify for active labour market programmes. 
Youth unemployment climbed steeply, reaching nearly 40% at its peak in 2011, by 
September-November 2014 the rate had fallen back to 32.1% but still higher than pre-
recession rates. The evaluation of the Youth Contract shows that some of this fall can 
be attributed to the success of the DfE component re-engaging young people NEET 
back into education; the programme was found to reduce the NEET rate by 1.8 
percentage points (Newton et al., 2013). Raising the education leaving age to 17 from 
September 2013 coincides with the steep fall in unemployment rates for 16-17 year 
olds. A further increase to age 18 from 2015 should also have an effect on keeping 
down future rates. 
 
Figure 8: Unemployment rates (ILO) by age – March 1992-October 2014 
 
 
Source: Statistics are taken from ONS Labour Market Statistics, January 2015 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/september-2014/index.html (last accessed 
22 January 2015). 
 
18-24 year olds also suffered during the recession. Their unemployment rates had 
fallen back since the high levels seen in the early 1990s recession (previously at 
17.8% in 1993); rates had been fairly stable at around 10% from the turn of the 
century but had also started increasing to reach 12% on the eve of the recession. 
Unemployment rates among 18-24 year olds increased steeply, first to around 18% in 
2009/10 and then increasing from the second half of 2011 to reach 20%. A steep 
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decline in the unemployment rate followed for this age group between July-September 
2013 and May-July 2014 (14.5%); although the rate has started increasing again up to 
15.1% September-November 2014.  
 
As noted earlier a lot of focus has been on trying to increase employment rates among 
disabled people. Some of the changes introduced have been in terms of tightening 
eligibility to, what are deemed, ‘inactive’ out of work benefits (benefits without active 
job seeking conditionality) with the movement away from Income Support/Incapacity 
Benefit claims to Employment and Support Allowance (and in some cases JSA) and 
dividing ESA claimants according to assessed capability to work. Although as noted 
earlier a much smaller share of existing claimants for disability related out of work 
benefits are found to be fit-for-work than the Government expected. People with 
disabilities who are assessed to be capable of work and qualify for ESA are fast 
tracked onto the Work Programme and, as noted earlier, even those considered not to 
be work ready for another 12 months have been referred to the Programme since 
October 2012. Here we look for evidence that these changes have had an effect on 
unemployment and inactivity rates. The period covered in Figure 9 spans April 1998 
through to September but there have been a number of breaks in the series as indicated 
due to changes in the questionnaire design (See Figure notes) therefore this series has 
a number of discontinuities.  
 
Unemployment rates among this group are higher than average unemployment rates 
across the economically active working age population (Figure 5 above). These rates 
increased from the beginning of 2008 (12%) through to the end of 2009 (14.4%) and 
continued to increase gradually over the next three years (14-16% - although rates not 
strictly comparable due to discontinuity) and then declined since the Autumn of 2013. 
Inactivity rates have declined since the late 1990s. The rates are not comparable 
across the three time periods but within each time period the trend is downwards and 
the latest evidence suggests that they still stand at more than double the rates found 
among the working age population as a whole (52.6% compared with 22.2% in July-
September 2014). There isn’t any strong evidence that inactivity rates increased 
among this group over the recent recession but this is difficult to say conclusively due 
to the break in the series. It is evident that they didn’t increase during 2009 when 
unemployment rates went up and there is some evidence to suggest in the second and 
third sub-period that inactivity rates among people with work limiting disabilities have 
fallen under the Coalition government (rates not comparable between periods). These 
population statistics cannot reveal the level of inactivity and unemployment that 
would have prevailed in the absence of policy changes made.  
 
Although there has been a major reassessment of long term sick and disabled people’s 
claims for out of work benefits with some being moving onto JSA and into the work 
related activity group of ESA this does not seem to have had a discernible effect on 
these trends. 
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Figure 9: Unemployment and inactivity rates (%) for people with work limiting 
disabilities 
 
 
Source: ONS; Table A08: Economic activity of people with disabilities (December 2014). 
Notes: (1) All people with a long-term health problem or disability that affects the kind and/or amount 
of work they do. Includes those people whose day-to-day activities are also limited. (2) Unemployed 
as a percentage of economically active. (3) In January 2010 a rewording of the section of the LFS 
covering disabilities resulted in an increase in the number of people estimated to have a disability or 
long-term health problem. (4) In April 2013 the wording of the questionnaire was changed to bring it 
into line with the Government Statistical Services Harmonised Standards and allow definitions to be 
consistent with the 2010 Equality Act.  
 
We complete this part by looking at the share of the working age population claiming 
various out of work benefits (Figure 10). There has been an overall decline in the total 
share of the working age population claiming out of work benefits over the period 
covered by these series; from August 1999 to May 2014. As the recession took hold 
the increase in the total share of the working age population claiming out of work 
benefits increased from 11% to 13%, driven by increases in the share of people 
claiming JSA. The share of the working age population claiming ESA and other 
Incapacity Benefits continued a declining trend that pre-dated the recession (starting 
from around 2004). 
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Figure 10: Share of the working age population claiming out of work benefits 
(GB) 
 
Source: ONS Labour market statistics, December 2014 
Notes: 
1. These figures includes all claimants of out of work benefits excluding carers (as they are not 
generally subject to labour market activation policies), and people claiming Universal Credit. While 
most people claiming these benefits will be out of work a small number will be in employment. The 
figure shows the most up to date National Statistics currently available for claimants of incapacity 
benefits, lone parent and "other income related" benefits. More up to date early estimates of 
incapacity and lone parent benefits, which are not currently designated as National Statistics, have 
been published by the DWP at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dwp-statistical-
summaries-2014. 
2. Each claimant is assigned to a statistical group to avoid double counting. There is a hierarchy as 
shown in the figure (ie, jobseeker followed by incapacity benefits, etc.). For example, a person 
claiming incapacity benefit and lone parent benefit is recorded in the former. 
3. JSA claimants for GB. Due to methodological differences, these figures differ slightly from 
estimates of jobseekers claimants shown at Table 1.1 of the DWP Quarterly Statistical Summary. 
More up to date estimates for claimants of JSA for the UK are available at reference table CLA01. 
4. ESA and other Incapacity Benefits include claimants of ESA, Incapacity Benefit and Severe 
Disablement Allowance.  
5. Lone parents include single recipients of Income Support with a child under qualifying age. 
6. Claimants of Income Support or Pension Credit not included in the incapacity benefits or lone 
parent categories. 
7. Proportions of population receiving state benefits have been calculated using residence based 
populations for those aged from 16 to 64. The jobseeker proportions differ from the claimant count 
rates shown at reference table CLA01 as the denominator for the latter is workforce jobs plus claimant 
count.   
 
The fall in the share of the working population claiming Income Support (IS) on the 
basis of being a lone parent has fallen over time and much of this fall is to do with 
changes in entitlement. From November 2008 once their youngest child turned 12 
lone parents were no longer entitled to claim IS instead they could apply for JSA. 
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Prior to this change they were entitled to claim IS until their youngest child left 
compulsory schooling at age 16. In October 2009 the age limit was lowered to 10, 
then to 7 in October 2010 and finally to 5 in May 2012. Since 2001 lone parents 
claiming IS have been required to attend regular Work Focused Interviews (WFIs); 
although there has been some variation over time in the requirements (see details in 
DWP (2014d)). Lone parents can be sanctioned for not attending mandatory WFIs 
(5.6% were sanctioned at least once in the year 2013/14 – DWP, 2014d). The other 
driving factor is that the employment rate for lone mothers has been rising over time 
and while it remains below the employment rate for mothers in a couple or cohabiting 
(60% compared to 72% in 2013); in 2013 a larger share of lone mothers were in 
employment than at any time since 1996, when comparable statistics began (ONS, 
2013).  
 
We now look at two areas of employment that warrant special attention: public sector 
employment and self-employment. The public sector deserves special attention 
because the government explicitly set out to reduce the size of the public sector. This 
was partly to make savings in public expenditure, a direct result of the cuts and also an 
ideological belief that the public sector should be reduced in size and this included 
reducing the size of the Civil Service. The Civil Service Reform Plan, published in 
2012, stated that estimates based on departmental change programmes, would mean 
that by 2015 the Civil Service will be around 23% smaller than it was in March 2010, 
operating with around 380,000 staff – the lowest since the Second World War (HM 
Government, 2012). The government believed that cuts in public sector employment 
would be balanced by expansion of the private sector in the belief that the public 
sector was effectively “crowding out” private sector employment28. 
 
Public sector employment29 as a share of total employment fell under the Coalition 
government from 21.5 per cent to 17.6 per cent but the fall is much less dramatic 
when major reclassifications are taken into account (19.4 per cent to 17.2 per cent) 
(Figure 11). These reclassifications are the ‘nationalisation’ of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group plc and Lloyds Banking Group plc and its subsidiaries in 2008 Q4 
due to both banks getting into difficulty during the financial crisis, and the subsequent 
return of Lloyds Banking Group to the private sector in 2014 Q1, and the privatisation 
of Royal Mail in 2013 Q4. In April 2012 ONS reclassified Sixth Form Colleges and 
Further Education Colleges in England into the private sector (affecting 196,000 
employees) reversing an earlier decision in October 2010. 
 
The final figure represents the lowest share since a consistent series has been 
computed from 1999. ONS estimates that public sector employment based on a 
headcount measure fell from around 6 million in 2007 (4.8 million FTE) to 5.4 million 
                                              
28
  There is some evidence that supports the view that public sector employment crowds out 
private sector employment (Behar and Mok, 2013). 
29
  Public sector employment figures are ONS estimates based on LFS measures of total 
employment and directly collated public sector employment estimates – see ONS Public 
Sector Employment, Q2 2014 for details. 
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(4.4 million FTE) in the second quarter of 2014 (or 5.6 million to 5.3 million 
excluding effects of reclassification based on a simple headcount) (ONS, 2014c).  
 
Figure 11: Trends in the share of public sector employment 
 
 
Source: ONS Public Sector Employment, Q3 2014 
 
Before turning to earnings we take a closer look at changes to self-employment over 
the recession as this holds an important key to understanding the overall trends in 
employment and unemployment (and probably also changes to public sector 
employment). 
 
Figure 12 shows the difference in the number of people in employment and self-
employment relative to that observed in Jan-Mar 2008. This shows that in the first 
three quarters the number of people in both forms of employment declined. However, 
after September 2009 the number of people in self-employment started to increase 
above the pre-recession level30. This was not the case for employees; the number of 
people in employment did not exceed the Jan-Mar 2008 level until Jul-Sept 2013, 
demonstrating very clearly the key role of self-employment which largely accounts for 
the recovery in the labour market. 
 
Self-employment not only played a key role in the recovery but by 2014 both the 
number of self-employed people (4.6 million31) and the share of total employment 
made up of self-employment (15 per cent, up from 8.7 per cent in 1975) were higher 
than at any point over the past 40 years (ONS, 2014d). 
 
More detailed statistical analysis shows that the change in the stock of self-employed 
people has been driven by a fall in the outflow rate (36 per cent of people entering 
                                              
30
  The first quarter of positive growth in GDP after the recession was 2009 Q3. 
31
  This figure refers to those who report self-employment as their main job, a further 356,000 
employees report a second job in which they are self-employed (ONS, 2014d). 
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self-employment in 2004 had left within five years compared with 23 per cent of 
people entering self-employment in 2009) rather than an increase in the inflow rate 
(which has remained largely stable at around 37 per cent32) (ONS, 2014d). One 
estimate shows that 28 per cent of the overall growth of self-employment is due to a 
decline in the rate at which people leave self-employment (D’Arcy and Gardiner, 
2014). 
 
The increase in self-employment may be due to the lack of other work options, 
particularly over the recession, and while this route into self-employment accounts for 
a minority, recent research estimates that it increased from 10 per cent to 27 per cent 
pre and post-recession (D’Arcy and Gardiner, 2014). There is also evidence that 
people are using self-employment as a means to extend reduced levels of work into 
older age (semi-retirement). Policy initiatives, such as the New Enterprise Allowance 
have increased the financial incentive to pursue this form of work and active labour 
market programmes are encouraging job seekers to actively pursue self-employment 
options. D’Arcy and Gardiner (2014) estimate that while prior to the recession 8 per 
cent of unemployed people moved into self-employment, the figure in the post-
recession period had increased to 11 per cent. DWP estimates show that up to June 
2014 some 53,350 people were helped to move off out-of-work benefits into self-
employment through the NEA programme; although not all are able to sustain their 
businesses and some will chose to move into employment (DWP, 2014e). There are 
no counterfactual estimates available. 
 
Despite the very positive role that self-employment has played in the recovery there is 
a downside and that is the evidence of considerable underemployment and a sharp fall 
in self-employment income since the crisis. ONS estimate that average income from 
self-employment fell by 22 per cent since 2008/09 (ONS, 2014d) and another recent 
study found that average weekly earnings of self-employed people in 2014 were 20 
per cent lower than they were in 2006/07 with people of prime age (35-50 years) 
experiencing the greatest average falls (26 per cent) (D’Arcy and Gardiner, 2014)33. 
Some of this fall appears to be due to a reduction in hours of work and some due to a 
change in the composition of self-employed people. 
 
There has been a longstanding concern that employers and employment intermediaries 
have been falsely declaring workers as self-employed to avoid payment of income tax 
and National Insurance Contributions, holiday pay and sick pay. As noted in Section 4 
this has been more problematic in some sectors than others with evidence that this 
practice was more commonplace in construction, security, cleaning and driving. While 
some policy changes, designed to tackle this problem, were introduced in 2014 it is 
still too early to tell if they have had an impact on reducing this negative form of self-
employment.  
                                              
32
  The inflow rate is defined as the share of the stock of self-employed people who entered self-
employment in the previous five years. 
33
  This study estimates that a typical self-employed person had earnings 40 per cent lower than a 
typical employed person in 2014. 
 53 
 
Figure 12: The number of individuals working as employees or in self-
employment relative to Jan-March 2008 levels (thousands) 
 
 
Source: ONS Self-employed workers in the UK - 2014; based on Labour Force Survey. 
 
Earnings 
Falling real average earnings has been one of the most striking features of the recent 
recession. Figure 13 charts real average weekly earnings growth from January 2001, 
demonstrating how average weekly earnings grew by less than prices (CPI index) 
from May 2008 with the sharpest decline occurring in February 2009. Positive real 
average earnings growth occurring in March 2010 and April 2013 reflects the large 
fall in earnings 12 month previously. Small positive real increases in average weekly 
earnings are observed in the private sector between January and March 2014 and 
between September and November 2014 but the overall picture is largely one of 
falling real average weekly earnings. Initially those working in the public sector didn’t 
fare as badly as private sector workers due to pay deals which had been negotiated 
prior to the recession but latterly average public sector workers’ pay has been falling 
further than the pay of private sector workers.  
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Figure 13: Changes in real average weekly earnings – annual percentage change 
(single month) 
 
 
Source: ONS based on Monthly Wages and Salary Survey figures (EARN01), January 2015. Growth 
is calculated as the change in total average weekly pay (including bonus payments). The figures relate 
to Great Britain. Growth rates are deflated by the CPI. 
 
Overall, average hourly wages are now lower in real terms than they were prior to the 
recession (Bovill, 2014). Gregg et al. (2014) document how the fall in real wages 
started prior to the recent recession and raise the possibility that this is part of a longer 
term trend which may continue even when the economy has recovered. Taylor et al. 
(2014) show that part of the fall in average wages can be explained by changes in the 
composition of those in work and changes in their hours of work. Detailed 
examination over the recession suggest that lower skilled lower paid workers were 
more likely to be laid off during the recession while firms were more likely to retain 
higher skilled higher paid workers but reduced costs by cutting real wages (CBI, 
2014). In fact in the first period lower paid, lower skilled workers were 
disproportionally laid-off and this moderated the fall in average wages. More recently 
the growth in jobs has been relatively greater for lower skilled, lower paid workers 
which has had the effect of reducing average real wages. However, Taylor et al. 
(2014) concludes that while changes in labour force composition explains some of the 
changes in real wages, the key driver to falling real wages is likely to have been the 
fall in productivity in 2008 and 2009, and its subsequent weakness.  
 
Figure 14, which compares average real hourly wages in 2013 with employees of the 
same age in 2009, shows that cuts in real average hourly wages have been felt across 
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the age distribution but particularly so among those aged 25-35 (in 2013). ONS has 
recently conducted cohort analysis which demonstrates that the falls in real average 
wages wiped out earlier relative wage gains among younger age cohorts, despite the 
fact that these younger cohorts are more highly qualified than older cohorts (ONS, 
2014e). Time will tell if their wages recover and if they are able to make up the lost 
ground over the next ten years or so.  
 
Figure 14: Median real hourly earnings (2013 prices) 
a) Age-earnings profiles    b) Lifetime profiles by age cohort 
 
Source: New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings Panel Dataset 2013 
 
An alternative way to examine wage growth is through the use of longitudinal data 
tracking the same people over a period of time and measuring the change in their 
actual wages rather than examining aggregate average wages. Figure 15 shows trends 
in real annual average hourly wage growth for employees. These observations are 
taken from Spring quarters (March-May) of the LFS. So for example, employees who 
were observed in employment in Spring 2010 and Spring 2011 had an average (mean) 
real hourly pay rise of 1.7%. However the median hourly pay change among these 
employees was a pay cut of 3.8%, highlighting the fact that mean wage growth tends 
to overstate pay rises of typical employees due to the fact that some employees 
experience very large increases in pay from one year to the next. A comparison with 
Figure 13 also demonstrates how workers who remain in work34 enjoy higher real 
increases in pay than the average measured across all employees, which includes new 
entrants to the labour market35. In addition, mean wage growth among those who 
remained in employment stayed positive over the recession although at the median 
real wage growth was negative showing that at least 50 per cent of employees 
experienced real cuts in their wages despite the fact that they remained in employment 
                                              
34
  Strictly speaking it is employees who are observed in work in both Spring quarters (12 
months apart) and some will have experienced time out of work in the intervening months. 
35
  These figures are not directly comparable as they are derived from different data sources and 
the LFS and definitions of earnings vary. 
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and that clearly some employees continue to see large wage gains (pulling up the 
mean measure). This suggests that entry wages have been hardest hit by the recession. 
 
Figure 15: Actual annual growth rates in real hourly wages among employees 
who remain in employment  
 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey 5 quarter panels (author’s calculations) 
 
Finally we focus on the lowest paid workers. Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
parties both pledged support for the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in their 
manifestos and also in the Coalition Agreement “because of the protection it gives 
low-income workers and the incentive it provides”. Despite this the real value of the 
NMW declined under the Coalition government and in October 2014 the minimum 
wage was no higher than its real terms level in 2005 (Resolution Foundation, 2014) 
even accounting for the first post-recession real terms increase in October 2014 
(increasing to £6.50 (adults), up 1.3% in real terms from £6.31). Research by the 
Resolution Foundation’s expert panel review into the Future of the National Minimum 
Wage highlighted the fact that while the NMW had effectively eradicated extreme low 
pay in the UK, the UK still has one of the highest incidences of low pay in the OECD. 
This was due in part to the cautious level of the NMW when it was introduced in 1999 
and the fact that in many low paying sectors the NMW had effectively been adopted 
as a “going-rate” by employers. This can be seen very clearly as a spike in the wage 
distribution at the value of the minimum wage (Resolution Foundation, 2014). The 
panel recommended, among other things, that the Low Pay Commission36 should 
                                              
36
  The Low Pay Commission independently makes a recommendation to the Government every 
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broaden its approach to tackling low pay and set an explicit long term ambition to 
reduce the incidence of low pay, set a recovery path for the NMW to restore the value 
it lost in real terms during the down-turn and that the government should routinely set 
out its views on how the NMW can contribute to its wider goal of reducing the 
incidence of low pay (expressed as a proportion of median pay). 
 
All three political parties have now called for an increase in the real value of the 
NMW. The Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne made the unprecedented 
move of publically calling for the Low Pay Commission (LPC) to restore the value of 
the NMW, recommend real terms increases in the NMW in 2014 and 2015 (up to £7) 
to return to the pre-recession value. This echoed Vince Cable’s call for a similar 
restoration at the Liberal Democrat 2013 party conference. Alan Buckle led a review 
on behalf of the Labour Party in 2013/14 and also recommended that rates should be 
restored to pre-recession levels as soon as possible and increased further in the future 
(Buckle, 2014). However, the LPC has outlined areas where government policy helps 
and hinders the scope for increasing minimum wage rates without having a negative 
impact on employment. In particular the LPC highlighted local authority spending on 
social care as an area where government policy limits the scope for higher minimum 
wages.  
 
The change in attitude to the NMW has been influenced by the evidence that the 
NMW has had very little, if any, negative effects on employment either when it was 
first introduced or in relation to uprating, despite alarmist warnings prior to the NMW 
being introduced in 1999. There is also a general unease about the way in which tax 
credits are effectively subsidising many low paid jobs and universal agreement across 
the parties that employers should be paying more of their share. 
 
How does all of this translate to changes in earnings inequality? Inequality in gross 
weekly earnings among employees measured by the 90:10 ratio (the ratio that 
compares the earnings above which 10% of the highest paid earn to the earnings 
below which 10% of the lowest paid earn) shows that earnings inequality increased 
over the recession (7.04 to 7.55) but remained fairly stable among full time employees 
showing that changes in the distribution of hours of work drove this increase (Figure 
16). The available evidence suggests that earnings inequality fell among all employees 
after 2011 but remained stable among full-time employees; again suggesting that this 
was driven by changes in the distribution of hours of work. Another factor influencing 
earnings inequality is change to the composition of the workforce. As earlier evidence 
has shown lower skilled, lower paid workers were more likely to lose their jobs over 
the recession and this is likely to have had a moderating effect on earnings inequality. 
Earnings inequality can fall even when the earnings of employees who remain in work 
are unchanged. For example, earnings at the 10th percentile can increase between two 
time periods when employees with the lowest earnings in the first period lose their 
jobs. Evidence on hourly earnings inequality from the LFS (measured by the 90:10 
ratio) show no discernible trend over the past five years with increases and decreases 
                                                                                                                                            
year, advising them of what rate the minimum wage should be set at. 
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across different time periods again suggesting that compositional factors are likely to 
have played a key role37. 
 
Figure 16: Inequality in weekly earnings of employees 1997-2013 
 
 
Source: ONS (2014) Patterns of Pay: Estimates from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, UK, 
1997-2013 
Notes: (a) Employees on adult rates, whose pay for the survey period was unaffected by absence; (b) 
Full-time defined as employees working more than 30 paid hours per week (or 25 or more for the 
teaching professions). (c) 2013p – 2013 data are provisional; 2011 soc10 - 2011 revised results on a 
SOC 2010 basis; 2011 - soc00 2011 provisional results on a SOC 2000 basis; 2006* - 2006 using 
2007 methodology; 2004 - exc 2004 results excluding supplementary information; 2004 - 2004 results 
reworked to be compatible with 2005 and 2006 results. 
 
Summary 
The Coalition government inherited high levels of unemployment resulting from the 
2007/08 financial crisis and the following recession but unemployment started to fall 
quite sharply from Spring 2013. Youth unemployment also dramatically increased 
during the recession but did not increase further under the Coalition and over the last 
year has started to fall aided no doubt by an increase in the education leaving age. 
While there is a gap between the claimant count and the ILO rate measures of 
unemployment this did not widen further under the Coalition government and 
inactivity rates have also not increased (even continued falling for women). A number 
of factors seem to have played a part. The labour market was in good shape prior to 
the recession and effective active labour market programmes were in place, wages fell 
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during the recession and self-employment expanded (even though self-employment 
income sank). It is notable that the recession was not accompanied by large scale 
industrial restructuring. This is likely to have avoided extensive skill redundancy and 
unemployment among older workers (which have both suffered in previous 
recessions). Low productivity and a poor recovery in productivity seem to be driving 
falling real wages and rising low wage employment both of which have implications 
for living standards and raise concerns about the strength of the recovery. 
 
9.  Discussion and conclusion 
If we compare what the Coalition Government has achieved during its term in office 
(2010-2015) against commitments outlined in the Coalition Agreement in relation to 
employment policy it is fair to conclude that with regard to policy changes both in 
terms of the introduction of new programmes and reforming existing programmes the 
Coalition Government has largely delivered. Although employment has reached new 
record levels, the performance of the Coalition Government’s active labour market 
programmes has not met with expectations and for some time and particularly for 
some groups of job seekers, they have delivered results below those achieved by the 
programmes that they replaced. 
 
The Government was assisted by a labour market that was in good shape leading into 
the Crisis, no large scale industrial restructuring over the recession and a well-
developed welfare-to-work policy platform on which to build. 
 
A reduction in the size of the public sector was off-set by an increase in the number of 
people working on a self-employed basis; no doubt some selling their services straight 
back to the Government or working for private and third sector providers under 
contract to the Government but the majority are working as sole traders. False 
definition of self-employment, set up by employers and employment intermediaries to 
avoid payment of income tax and National Insurance Contributions have recently been 
tackled to some extent by the Coalition Government but the exploitation of workers 
through the use of self-employment and the evidence of large falls in average real 
earnings for self-employed people takes the shine off the growth in this form of 
employment. 
 
The UK labour market in many ways weathered the recession surprisingly well. 
Unemployment increased but not by as much as in recent recessions. A number of 
factors made this possible. Firstly real wages fell, allowing employers to cut labour 
costs without making large reductions to their workforce. A larger share of the 
workforce worked on a self-employment basis. The real economy was in good shape 
leading up to the recession and this meant that it was more resilient than was the case 
in previous recessions. No large scale industrial restructuring seems to have occurred; 
although there were inevitably some sectors that contracted more and others that have 
enjoyed higher growth. This has helped avoid the scenario where large numbers of 
people find that their skills are redundant and no doubt explains why unemployment 
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and inactivity rates have not grown among older workers. Blundell et al. (2013) show 
that employment rates among older men remained much stronger during and after the 
2008/09 recession than in the 1980s and 1990s recessions, remaining fairly flat, while 
there is some evidence that employment rates among older women actually increased 
slightly. On the eve of the recession the workforce was better qualified, flexible, 
adaptable and more used to coping with change. All of these factors contributed to a 
remarkably resilient labour market. 
 
However, the consequence of falling real wages, underemployment both among 
employees and the self-employed is that living standards have fallen. There has been 
pain and the brunt has still been borne disproportionately by those least advantaged 
but arguably it has been shared more evenly than if unemployment had increased 
further instead. In addition, labour hoarding has contributed to falling productivity 
with output per hour still below pre-recession levels.  
 
These conditions overall mean that firms should be in a strong position to gain from 
the upturn and the labour market should recover quite quickly but a recovery in real 
wages seem unlikely without significant increases in productivity.  
 
A detailed examination of the effectiveness of welfare-to-work reform doesn’t 
produce such a rosy picture. Many interventions have not undergone robust evaluation 
and therefore it is difficult to assess how effective they have been in meeting their 
aims. Some have been shown to be largely ineffective, such as Mandatory Work 
Activity. The National Audit Office in a recent assessment, concludes that the Work 
Programme is producing job outcomes and employment sustainment at rates that are 
comparable with previous welfare to work schemes for some job seekers, although 
recognising that more recent cohorts appear to be faring better than early cohorts of 
job seekers and there is a potential for improvements to continue (NAO, 2014). They 
also highlight the low performance among some of the hardest to help groups where 
the Work Programme is judged to be producing results below that of employment 
programmes that it replaced; programmes described as “failing” in the Conservative 
2010 manifesto. The Government was also too hasty in its decision to scrap the Future 
Jobs Fund – which evaluation evidence has demonstrated produced good results and 
value for money. 
 
While the majority of unemployment benefit claimants are out of work for short 
periods of time – around 90% of JSA claimants are no longer claiming after 12 
months – those that do go on to experience long term unemployment, despite all of the 
innovation, are still struggling to move back into employment. Even in the most recent 
cohorts the majority of those who have benefited from interventions over a period of 
two years while on the Work Programme are returned to Jobcentre Plus without 
securing a job; 68% of all those who had completed the programme up to September 
2014 returned to Jobcentre Plus. These two years are in addition to the interventions 
prior to claimants joining the Work Programme which could be for a period of 12 
months. The Government’s answer – Help to Work – seems unlikely to succeed for 
this group.  
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Financial incentives to providers to increase efforts for the “hardest to help”, including 
for those with a disability or long term illness, don’t appear to have been enough as 
there remains evidence of “creaming” and “parking”. The Government expects that 
only 6.7% of ESA claimants with a 12 month prognosis and 8.6% of claimants 
moving from IB to ESA to secure a job outcome (12 weeks in work) by the time they 
complete the programme. This raises serious questions about the reliability of the 
assessments that deem these claimants work-ready, whether the Work Programme is 
the right intervention for this group and whether the incentive payments are sufficient 
to motivate rational profit-making providers to invest in these groups with such a low 
rate of return. The Government both overestimated the share of Incapacity Benefit 
claimants that would be found to be capable of work in a limited capacity (based on 
Work Capability Assessments) and the extent to which those who were assessed to be 
capable of work would secure employment with the assistance of the Work 
Programme. These findings call into question what the WCA outcomes mean in 
practice given that only 6-7% of some ESA claimants are expected to have found 12 
weeks of work at the end of two years of participating in a welfare to work 
programme. It does suggest that the Government underestimated the barriers that 
many of these claimants face and in designing a new programme for this group in 
particular needs some very careful thought on the type and timing of support.  
 
There are a number of positive features in the way employment policy has evolved 
under the Coalition Government such as extending the length of time assistance is 
provided for the long term unemployed and those facing the greatest challenges to 
securing work to two years (up from 12 months). The stronger focus on longer term 
outcomes and employment retention with incentive payments to private providers to 
back this up is a welcome development. And a system which provides greater 
incentive to help those hardest to reach and hardest to help has the potential to 
produce positive results.  
 
The clearest message that can be gleaned from the experience of the last seventeen 
years, since governments have actively sought to reduce unemployment through 
active labour market programmes, is that there are no cheap quick fixes. Both the 
Labour government’s New Deal programmes and the Coalition government’s Work 
Programme have struggled to have big net impacts on reducing unemployment, the 
length of unemployment benefit claims and increasing sustained levels of employment 
among those who qualify for programme assistance (usually those who experience or 
are at risk of long term unemployment and/or those who are least job-ready and have 
low levels of skills). Many of these participants have, over the years, cycled through a 
variety of active labour market programmes.  
 
What is required for a relatively large hard core of individuals at risk of spending a 
large proportion of their working lives out of work is a substantial investment 
programme. These individuals have often left school with very low levels of 
qualification, have few skills (in terms of those that command a reward in the labour 
market), and face a number of confounding factors that affect their employability 
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(drug and alcohol dependency, criminal record, etc.), have work limiting health and 
disability issues. 
 
It was announced from the start that the Work Programme would last for a fixed term 
(and many of the other interventions such as the Youth Contract were also introduced 
for a fixed period of time) with the last cohort of participants entering the programme 
in March 2017 (recently extended by 12 months). The reason for this no doubt is the 
fact that the Work Programme is a Coalition government policy and both the 
Conservative party and the Liberal Democrat party will want to go into the next 
election with manifesto commitments containing their own design of a welfare to 
work programme. The 2014 NAO report highlights the problems associated with the 
rapid introduction of large scale active labour market programme reform both in terms 
of errors made in contracts with private providers resulting in financial waste and the 
initial low levels of performance as providers source provision, cope with large 
numbers of referrals from the stock of unemployed people, and generally sort out 
teething problems. This is not only wasteful but has a detrimental effect on the very 
people that the programmes are designed to help. On the current timescale the next 
Government will have to start working-up a replacement programme fairly rapidly to 
limit disruption on employment services for jobseekers (although, thankfully the 
recent extension of provider contracts by 12 months has increased the amount of time 
available). One advantage with the next transition is that any new programme will 
only need to cope with inflows as those who have entered the Work Programme will 
remain on it for up to two years. This should avoid the ‘bulge’ and the associated 
challenges this poses for new providers. 
 
Now that all three main political parties have had direct experience in government of 
the challenges associated with the design and delivery of employment policy, perhaps, 
hopefully, we have reached a point where future developments can be tinged with less 
point scoring and rubbishing what has gone before but an acceptance that difficult 
policy problems require long-term concerted action that would positively benefit from 
some degree of cross-party consensus. The experience gained over the past few years 
hopefully provides an opportunity to build on what has been learnt and to identify 
what still needs to be done in this critical area of social policy in any climate. 
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Annex 1 – Classification of employment policy expenditure in PESA data 
The expenditure figures used in this paper are drawn from Public Expenditure 
Statistical Analyses (PESA) data which have been classified according to the UN’s 
Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG). Expenditure on 
employment policy under this classification scheme comes under Division 4 
Economic affairs; Group 4.1 General economic, commercial and labour affairs; Class 
4.1.2 General labour affairs (CS). The official documentation provides the following 
note of what government expenditure should be reported in this class: 
 Administration of general labour affairs and services; formulation and 
implementation of general labour policies; supervision and regulation of labour 
conditions (hours of work, wages, safety, etc.); liaison among different branches of 
government and between government and overall industrial, business and labour 
organizations; 
 operation or support of general programmes or schemes to facilitate labour 
mobility, to reduce sex, race, age and other discrimination, to reduce the rate of 
unemployment in distressed or underdeveloped regions, to promote the 
employment of disadvantaged or other groups characterized by high 
unemployment rates, etc.; operation of labour exchanges; operation or support of 
arbitration and mediation services; 
 production and dissemination of general information, technical documentation and 
statistics on general labour affairs and services; 
 grants, loans or subsidies to promote general labour policies and programmes. 
 Excludes: labour affairs of a particular industry (classified to (04.2) through (04.7) 
as appropriate); provision of social protection in the form of cash benefits and 
benefits in kind to persons who are unemployed (10.5.0). 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=4 – last accessed 8 September 
2014) 
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Annex 2 – Outputs 
Volume of referrals and participants for various components of pre-work programme 
interventions. 
 
Table A1: Participant volumes in Youth Contract provision  
 April 2012 – May 2014 
Work Experience starts 147,670 
Sector based work academies pre-employment 
training starts 
60,790  
Wage incentive job starts 99,110  
Individuals for whom a wage incentive payment has 
been made 
20,030  
 
Source: Youth Contract Official Statistics, DWP August 2014 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/347896/OFFICIAL_Y
outh_Contract_Official_Statistics_August_2014.pdf  
Note: Updated Youth Contract statistics due for publication 3rd February 2015. 
 
Table A2: Participant volumes in Mandatory Programmes – May 2011 – August 
2014 
 Referrals Starts 
Mandatory Work Activity (GB) 251,200 105,610 
Skills Conditionality – Initial provider 
interview (England) 
726,340 420,150 
Skills Conditionality – training (GB) 899,760 492,980 
Skills Conditionality - National Careers 
Service (England) 
866,230 535,000 
 
Source: Mandatory Programmes Official Statistics, DWP November 2014 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/376547/mandatory-
programme-statistics-to-aug-2014.pdf  
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Table A3: Participant volumes on the Pre Work Programme (Get Britain 
Working measures) 
Work Experience placement1 238,210 (1/2011 - 6/2014) 
New Enterprise Allowance business mentor starts2 115,750 (4/2011 - 9/2014) 
New Enterprise Allowance weekly allowance starts2 60,480 (4/2011 - 9/2014) 
Sector based work academy pre-employment 
training starts1 
128,990 (7/2011 - 5/2014) 
 
Sources: (1) Youth Contract Official Statistics, DWP August 2014 – includes all starts not just those 
joining under the Youth Contract 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/347896/OFFICIAL_Y
outh_Contract_Official_Statistics_August_2014.pdf 
(2) Great Britain New Enterprise Allowance Quarterly Official Statistics (December 2014), DWP 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389249/NEA-statistics-
apr-to-sept-2014.pdf  
 
Table A4: Participant volumes for Access to Work by customer type 
Existing 
customer 
New 
customer Total 
2010-11 22,490 13,330 35,820 
2011-12 20,770 10,010 30,780 
2012-13 20,670 10,830 31,510 
2013-14 22,820 12,690 35,530 
2014-15 (Q1) 21,650 2,890 24,540 
 
Source: Access to Work: Official Statistics October 2014 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/365329/access-to-
work-statistics-april-june-2014.pdf  
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Table A5: Work Choice statistics 
Quarter Referrals Starts 
Q3 2010-11 17,960 15,970 
Q4 2010-11 5,570 4,860 
Q1 2011-12 4,050 2,710 
Q2 2011-12 3,690 2,820 
Q3 2011-12 3,960 3,170 
Q4 2011-12 5,500 4,100 
Q1 2012-13 4,780 3,520 
Q2 2012-13 5,210 3,930 
Q3 2012-13 5,310 3,900 
Q4 2012-13 6,490 4,750 
Q1 2013-14 6,230 4,650 
Q2 2013-14 6,880 4,960 
Q3 2013-14 6,780 5,130 
Q4 2013-14 7,380 5,350 
Q1 2014-15 6,460 4,620 
Total 96,210 74,440 
 
Notes: (1) Where an individual has both a supported and unsupported outcome, the first outcome is 
counted here. 
Source: Work Choice: Official Statistics November 2014 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/373185/work-choice-
official-statistics-nov-2014.pdf  
 
No statistics are made available by DWP on the number of participants who engage 
with: Work Clubs, Work Together or Enterprise Clubs. 
 
 
 
 
